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Although over seventy percent of the American population lives
in cities,1 and nearly forty-five percent of all funds spent on govern-
ment in America are spent at the local level, 2 American cities have
remarkably little inherent power. According to modern legal the-
ory, cities are "mere subdivisions of the state"; their only powers are
those given by state statutes, which courts construe strictly and state
legislatures may modify at any time. 3
The powerlessness of cities is particularly important today be-
cause of a series of recent Supreme Court decisions that have wid-
ened the scope of local government liability. The traditional lack of
local government sovereignty has been fundamental, for example,
to decisions holding cities liable under the antitrust laws 4 and under
section 1983 5-decisions that have compounded the limitations on
cities' power to govern.
6
The rise of cities' legal powerlessness is particularly intriguing be-
cause modern American local government law developed from the
English law of corporate boroughs. Yet, although borough corpora-
l. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL DATA BOOK AND GUIDE
TO SOURCES, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 19, 26 (1984).
2. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE AND LOCAL ROLES IN
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 6 (1982) (citing figures for FY 1977).
3. C. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 50-51, 69-70 (1980).
4. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1982)
(unlike states, cities not exempt from antitrust laws); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power &
Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (cities not sovereign and there-
fore not exempt from antitrust laws); L. ORLAND, The Requirements for Antitrust Immunity, in
ANTrrRUST AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 73 U. Siena ed. 1982) (cities do not receive antitrust ex-
emptions of states).
5. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650 (1980) (municipalities have no
qualified immunity in § 1983 suits); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)
(municipalities not immune from liability under § 1983).
6. R. FREILICH & R. CARLISLE, SWORD AND SHIELD 5-7 (1983); Freilich, 1979-1980 An-
nual Review of Local Government Law: Municipal Liability and Other Certain Uncertainties, 12 URn.
LAW. 577 (1980); Jaron, The Threat of Personal Liability Under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Does It
Interfere with the Performance of State and Local Government, 13 URB. LAW. 1 (1981).
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tions exercised a broad range of both public and private powers and
were substantially immune from state sovereignty, their modem
American counterparts, municipal corporations, are purely public
entities subject to the will of the sovereign states. The transition
from borough to municipal corporation, which was completed in
less than eighty years, provides the opportunity for a close study of
legal change.
7
A recent major study, Hendrik Hartog's Public Property and Private
Power, 8 details the transformation of New York City from corporate
borough to municipal corporation and portrays that city's transfor-
mation as central to the development of the legal framework of
American cities' powerlessness. 9 Hartog contends that in the period
from 1800 to 1830 confusion reigned over the status of American
localities. 10 Hartog maintains that the confusion was cleared up
during the period from 1835 to 1860 primarily in cases involving
New York City. 1
In Hartog's description of the law of city status during the first
third of the nineteenth century, he cites cases from different states
as if they were part of a unitary American approach to the legal sta-
7. Steward Kyd published the definitive treatise on the law of corporate boroughs in
two volumes in 1793-94. S. KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS (London 1793-
94).John F. Dillon published the definitive American treatise stating the current framework of
American local government law in 1872. J. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS (1872).
8. H. HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER (1983). Hartog's book has re-
ceived uniformly favorable reviews in historyjournals. Appleby, Defining the Public Realm: Prop-
erty, Power, and Urban Politics in the New Nation (Book Review), 12 REVIEWS IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 198 (1984); Bussey, Book Review, HISTORY: REVIEW OF NEW BOOKS, March, 1984, at
101; Katz, Book Review, 1984 AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 1149. Such reviews are justified
because they focus on what Hartog has done extremely well. As a close analysis of the devel-
opment of New York City into a modern municipal corporation, Hartog's book is meticulously
and extraordinarily rich. As a description of the development of American local government
law, the study has major drawbacks. This Article explores those limitations.
9. H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 13-20, 259-65. Hartog does not study in depth either the
law or the "governmental culture" of any state other than New York. Presumably, Hartog's
implication is that such study is unnecessary for an understanding of the development of the
American law of municipal corporations. Hartog's explicit claims are more modest. He notes
that "cases involving New York City were leading decisions in many areas of municipal corpo-
ration doctrine." Id. at 5.
This Article is the first in a series that will trace the development of important aspects of
municipal corporation law and discuss their relationship to events outside of New York. The
Article does not contend that New York law played an unimportant role in the formulation of
American local government law. Rather, a goal of the series will be to trace the relationship
between events in New York and contemporaneous developments elsewhere.
10. Id. at 7, 184-85.
11. Id- at 5. Philadelphia was the only major American city other than New York that was
a borough corporation. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1096 (1980).
Pennsylvania's state legislature abolished Philadelphia's incorporation shortly after the
Revolution. SeeJ. TEAFORD, THE MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 82-85 (1975). After the
Revolution, therefore, New York City was the only major American corporate borough.
1985]
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tus of American localities. 12 This article questions that assumption.
It concludes that the transition from the English law of corporate
boroughs to the American law of municipal corporations occurred
quite differently in New York and Massachusetts.13 Between 1800
and 1830, New York courts were convinced that English corporation
law had continuing validity. Because the English law said that only
boroughs were corporations, New York courts insisted that towns
were not corporations.' 4 By contrast, Massachusetts courts held as
early as 1816 that English law was inapplicable in Massachusetts be-
cause New England towns were a new type of "municipal" corpora-
tion.15 The invention of the municipal corporation in Massachusetts
in 1816 calls into question Hartog's claim that the basic structure of
American municipal corporation law was developed in New York
cases in the period between 1835 and 1860.16
Because no adequate study of the English law exists, section I of
this Article examines certain elements of English corporation law
that proved crucial to its application in America. Section II de-
scribes the dramatically different reception of the English law in
New York and Massachusetts.
I. ENGLISH CORPORATION LAW
In their efforts to formulate a legal status for towns and cities,
courts in both New York and Massachusetts looked first to English
corporation law. This section analyzes certain aspects of English
law that became important once the law reached American shores.
The section first describes what I call the "feudal logic" of English
corporation law-an aspect of English law that explains why the law
was extremely unstable (even in England) by the eighteenth century
and why nineteenth century Massachusetts courts considered it
"common sense" that the law was not relevant to their situation.
The section then discusses the tension in the English law between
12. H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 179-204.
13. Obvious limitations accompany this Article's exclusive focus on cases from Massa-
chusetts and New York. Without further study it is impossible to determine whether courts in
states without the firm 17th century roots of New York and Massachusetts ever understood
the difference between the use of the word "corporation" as it refers to the English borough,
see infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text, and the 19th century American use of the word.
See infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text (discussing New York); infra notes 267-92 and
accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts). Courts in such states may simply have been
unaware of the English usage.
14. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 312-89 and accompanying text.
16. H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 5. The invention of the municipal corporation in 1816
did not mean that the American law of municipal corporations had fully developed. Yet by
1816 Massachusetts had established two crucial changes to English corporation law that
Hartog dates much later. See infra notes 312-89 and accompanying text.
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the historical and theoretical definitions of "corporations." Courts
in New York adhered to the traditional understanding that corpora-
tions were a historically defined closed set, while courts in Massa-
chusetts seized upon the contradictory theoretical definition of
"corporations" as the basis for their holding that Massachusetts
towns were a new type of "municipal" corporation.
A. The Feudal Logic of English Corporation Law
English corporation law developed as a coherent doctrinal frame-
work in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 17 and reached its ma-
ture form by 1659, when William Shepheard wrote the first treatise
on the subject.18 By the time Stewart Kyd published his influential
two-volume corporation law treatise in 1793-94,19 certain of the
law's most basic elements-elements that were feudal in origin and
rationale-had long been anachronistic. Yet two major aspects of
the law's "feudal logic" persisted and ultimately proved particularly
important to the development of local government law in
America.20
The first anachronistic feature of corporation law was the defini-
tion of borough corporations' normal powers. The traditional set of
borough powers dated from the late middle ages, before the mod-
em notion of mutually exclusive public and private spheres
predominated. Consequently, corporate boroughs exercised both
public and private powers. By the eighteenth century, critics viewed
the boroughs' traditional political powers as unduly oligarchical,
and their traditional economic powers as excessively monopolistic.
21
17. 3 W. HoDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 469-90 (1923) (discussing develop-
ment of the corporation).
18. W. SHEPHEARD, OF CORPORATIONS, FRATERNITIES AND GUILDS OR A DISCOURSE,
WHEREIN THE LEARNING OF THE LAW TOUCHING BODIES-POLITIQUE IS UNFOLDED (London
1659) (there are many alternate spellings of the author's name, including Sheppard, Shepard
and Shepherd.) Shepheard's treatise is basically a handbook on how to draft borough char-
ters. As in modern practice manuals, it is long on practical advice and short on theory.
The second treatise on English corporation law was published anonymously in 1702.
ANON., THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS (London 1702) [hereinafter cited as 1702 Treatise]. The
1702 Treatise notes that the only other treatise available was "a little Duodecimo by Mr.
Shepheard." Id at A3.
19. 1 S. KYD, supra note 7. Kyd's treatise was the most influential treatise on both sides
of the Atlantic in the early 19th century. H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 185.
20. By focusing on English corporation law's "feudal logic," this Article does not reas-
sert Jon Teaford's claim that New York and other American boroughs in fact functioned as
feudal boroughs. See J. TEAFORD, THE MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 16-34 (1965).
Hartog has effectively refuted that claim. See H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 33-43. This Article
only asserts that English corporation law defined two of the categories that the law used to
"carve up the world" in relation to feudal society because of the English borough's feudal
origins.
21. See S. REYNOLDS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH MEDIEVAL TOWNS
135 (1977) (noting traditional view that English towns moved from archaic democracy toward
1985] 373
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Just as the powers granted to English boroughs were defined in
relation to feudal society, so was the dividing line between what was
and what was not a corporation. Groups that the law identified as
aggregate corporations 22 seem unrelated to the modem eye:
chartered boroughs, companies of merchants, including guilds,
23
and universities. 24 What did these groups share that caused them to
be identified as corporations, while other groups, such as villages
and towns, were not? The answer is that "incorporated" entities
were corporations because they shared a special relationship to feu-
dal society: each of the major English "corporations" developed
from the late feudal practice of granting charters to groups that
wanted to "opt out" of feudal obligations.25 This division between
groups that were corporations and groups that were not was the sec-
ond anachronistic aspect of English corporation law.
1. The feudal logic of corporate boroughs'powers
a. The absence of a public/private distinction in feudal society
American legal historians have long been fascinated by the rise of
the public/private distinction. Understandably, most studies focus
on the development and decline of the distinction in America.26 To
understand why corporate boroughs exercised both public and pri-
vate powers, however, one must return to feudal Europe.
Hartog links boroughs' mixture of public and private roles with
eighteenth century civic humanism. 27 Hartog's claim that eight-
oligarchy). Reynolds offers a critique both of this traditional view and of an alternative and
more recent view. lI- at 135-39, 171-77. Reynolds provides an extremely sophisticated and
measured reassessment of the relevant English medieval town history, and this Article relies
heavily upon her work.
22. Common-law corporations were divided into corporations aggregate, composed of
groups of people, and corporations sole. See 1 S. KYD, supra note 7, at 19-22. This Article
deals with corporations aggregate only. Corporations sole had quite a different development.
See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 470-82.
23. 1 S. KYD, supra note 7, at 63. Kyd suggested that guilds probably were the first
chartered corporations, and that the practice of expressly incorporating towns by charter
probably was modeled upon the granting of charters to guilds. Id.
24. Id. at 328.
25. Id at 42-43.
26. See, e.g., The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289-1602 (1982) (sympo-
sium). For critiques of the coherence of late 19th century public/private distinctions, see 0.
HANDLIN & M. HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH 51-133 (1969) (discussing relationship of govern-
ment and economy in Massachusetts from 1774 to 1861) [hereinafter cited as COMMON-
wEALTHr]; H. HARTOG, supra note 8, passim; Hartog, Because All the World Was Not New York City,
28 BUFFALo L. REV. 91 (1979) (tracing changing definition of corporation in New York from
1730 to 1860); Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1423
(1982) (tracing development of public/private distinction through movements in political and
legal thought).
27. See H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 21-24; see also infra note 66 (critiquing Hartog's view
on role of civic humanism).
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eenth century New Yorkers understood New York City's borough
structure in terms of civic humanism may well be justified. Yet the
boroughs' mixture of public and private powers dashed with the
growing tendency in the eighteenth century to think of the national
government as purely public.28 In fact, the boroughs' combination
of public and private powers was a holdover from their feudal
origin.
Historians agree that no sharp distinction between public and pri-
vate powers existed in the middle ages. 29 Feudalism arose in the
vacuum of power that resulted from the fall of the Roman Empire. 30
Feudal society substituted a complex system of personal relation-
ships in place of government; these relationships provided a degree
of protection in a violent age. In the fourth and fifth centuries A.D.,
[n]either the State nor the family any longer provided adequate
protection .... [A]t all levels of society, if one wished to protect
oneself ... one could do no better ... than attach oneself to
someone more highly placed. [Feudal society arose from the] in-
creasing use of pacts of protection and obedience.
31
Two types of relationships, initially quite different, composed the
"protective network." At the top of the social scale, the protective
relations originated in military alliances. Private fighting men chose
their chiefs, and received gifts in return.3 2 In the early period, the
choice of both the lord and vassal was temporary, as was possession
of the gifts, or "fiefs. ' '33
At the lower end of the social scale, the feudal relationship be-
tween peasants and their lords did not have its origin in alliances of
military chiefs, but was grafted onto a much older set of manorial
relationships.3 4 Like the relationship between lord and vassal, the
28. Horwitz, supra note 26, at 1423.
29. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 230-31 (2d ed. 1898);J.
STRAYER, ON THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE MODERN STATE 7, 13 (1970).
30. M. BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 148-49 (L.A. Manyon trans. 1964). Several eminent con-
temporary scholars of medieval history have explicitly adopted many of Bloch's basic conclu-
sions. See, e.g., D. HERLIHY, THE HISTORY OF FEUDALISM 1-6 (1970);J. Adams, Lecture Notes,
History 50A, ch. 15, at 7-13 (unpublished manuscript available at The American University
Law Review).
England was fully feudal after 1066. R. BROWN, ORIGINS OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 21 (1973).
31. M. BLOCH, supra note 30, at 148-49; see also D. HERLIHY, supra note 30, at 3. Herlihy
contends that
[fQeudal institutions were not only spontaneous in development but were also in
some sense 'domestic,' as they initially concerned not the king and the great men of
the realm but the humbler freemen, who within the vacuum of governmental author-
ity had to arrange for their own protection, security and support.
Id
32. M. BLOcH, supra note 30, at 145-62.
33. Id at 163-68.
34. Id at 219-24. One innovative feature of Bloch's analysis is his rejection of the tradi-
tional distinction between feudalism and manorialism. J. Adams, supra note 30, at 7-8.
1985] 375
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relationship between lord and tenant originated in personal tastes
and needs.
Nothing varied more from manor to manor according to locality,
nothing exhibited more diversity, than the burdens of tenancy in
. . . [early feudal times]. On certain days, the tenant brings the
lord's steward perhaps a few small coins or, more often, sheaves
of corn harvested on his fields, chickens from his farmyard, cakes
of wax from his beehives or from the swarms of the neighbouring
forest. At other times, he works on the arable or the meadows of
the demesne. Or else we find him carting casks of wine or sacks of
corn on behalf of the master to distant residences. His is the la-
bour which repairs the walls or moats of the castle. If the master
has guests the peasant strips his own bed to provide the necessary
extra bed-clothes. When the hunting season comes round, he
feeds the pack. If war breaks out he does duty as foot-soldier or
orderly, under the leadership of the reeve of the village.3 5
Eventually both sets of relationships became standardized. At the
upper end of the social scale, the link between lord and vassal be-
came first permanent and then hereditary.3 6 Feudal duties and ben-
efits also stabilized. Moreover, the fief came to involve hereditary
possession of land. Feudal services, or "incidents," were due in re-
turn. These incidents, originally military in nature, eventually
evolved into a wide variety of cash or barter payments or, less fre-
quently, into non-military services.37 Thus, what began as a series
of military alliances grew into a system of feudal relationships. The
relationships at the lower end of the social scale also became stan-
dardized, as the relationship between lord and tenant came to be
ruled by the "custom of the manor." In theory, both the lord and
the tenants were bound to observe these ancestral rules.38
A lasting impact of feudal society's origins was its failure to view
public and private powers as belonging to mutually exclusive
spheres. Medieval chieftains busy subjugating their neighbors were
not interested in exercising only "governmental" powers. Rather,
they were interested in appropriating for themselves all the benefits
it seemed feasible to appropriate.3 9
When feudal institutions were formalized, the lack of a pub-
35. M. BLOCH, supra note 30, at 249-50.
36. Id at 145-62.
37. See id. at 163-75, 194-210. Adams has noted that "English and German historians
. . . tend to see feudalism as first of all a military management, characterized by the patterns
of knights' fees." J. Adams, supra note 30, at 5; see also C. STEPHENSON, MEDIEVAL FEUDALISM
12-13 (1956) (discussing original military nature of feudalism).
38. M. BLOCH, supra note 30, at 248-49.
39. See id. at 219-24 (discussing feudal duties that lords received from vassals).
376
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lic/private distinction persisted.40 Consequently, feudal lords exer-
cised some powers that modem law considers "private" (for
example, lords' rights as their serfs' "landlord") 4 1 in addition to
other clearly "public" powers (such as the right to judge their sub-
jects in manorial courts).42 This mixture of public and private rights
characterized not only the powers of feudal lords, but also the pow-
ers of boroughs to which feudal lords began to grant a certain de-
gree of autonomy in the late feudal period.
43
b. The feudal logic of corporate boroughs'powers
Towns existed in medieval times, separate from the peasants and
those in authority over them, as "isolated nuclei" of merchants and
craftsmen. 44 Towns were dominated by "burgesses, ' 45 who were
similar in many ways to knights in rural areas, but crucially different
in other respects, including their focus on commerce.
46
A fairly large number of English towns were chartered as borough
"corporations" in the late feudal era.47 These corporations owed
40. When feudal institutions were formalized, "statesmen, administrators and lawyers"
attempted "to make sense of the confused traditions they had inherited [and]. . .to put them
together into systems supporting an ordered society." D. HERLIHY, supra note 30, at 71. His-
torians have interpreted feudal society's lack of a public/private distinction at this later period
in different ways. Some historians maintain that the protective relationship remained the cen-
tral organizing principle. E.g., J. Adams, supra note 30, at 11-23. Others shift their focus onto
the property relationship between lord and vassal:
[T]he property aspects of the feudal tie were coming to outweigh the personal as-
pects of vassalage. This process is what French scholars call the realisation of the
feudal bond, growing dominance of 'real' property and 'real' rights in it over the
considerations of sentiment and loyalty which had originally inspired the feudal
relationship.
D. HERLIHY, supra note 30, at 77.
Maitland takes the argument a step further, and argues that government was property:
Just in so far as the ideal of feudalism is perfectly realized, all that we call public law
is merged in private law: jurisdiction is property, office is property, the kingship itself
is property; and the same word dominium has to stand now for the ownership and now
for lordship.
F. POLLOCK & F. MArrITAND, supra note 29, at 230-31. Maitland's analysis of feudalism as the
linkage of government and property is strikingly similar to Hartog's analysis of 18th century
New York City, and, in fact, Hartog quotes Maitland and notes that the linkage dates back to
feudal times. H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 23-25, 179-80.
41. See M. BLOCH, supra note 30, at 167.
42. I& at 221-24.
43. See S. REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 108-14.
44. Id. at 353.
45. According to Reynolds, the word "burgesses" appears to have acquired a relatively
precise meaning, denoting those members of a borough corporation who have contributed
their share of borough dues. S. REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 97.
46. M. BLOCH, supra note 30, at 353.
47. See M. WEINBAUM, THE INCORPORATION OF BOROuGHs 48-125 (1937) (discussing
evolution of incorporation from early period to classic age of incorporation). Those bor-
oughs that were not founded in feudal times tended to receive "typical borough powers,"
and, therefore, (perhaps not consciously) were modeled after boroughs that were founded in
feudal times.
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their existence to the feudal practice of granting charters, which
were formal documents describing the rights and obligations on
each side of a feudal relationship. 48 Early municipal charters varied
widely from place to place. Originally, charters represented spe-
cially tailored "deals" between seignorial lords (or the king) and
burgesses. These charters served in part to formalize prior obliga-
tions or "customs," and in part to change old ways. 49 The core of
borough powers that gradually arose was designed to eliminate the
impediments burgesses faced in their pursuit of commerce:
[A]s a speculator in real estate [the burgess] found feudal re-
strictions on landed property intolerable. Because his business
had to be handled rapidly and, as it grew, continued to set new
legal problems, the delays, the complications, the archaism of the
traditional judicial procedures exasperated him. The multiplicity
of authorities governing the town itself offended him as obstacles
to the proper control of business transactions and as an insult to
the solidarity of his class. The diverse immunities enjoyed by his
ecclesiastical or knightly neighbours seemed to him so many
hinderances to the free pursuit of profit. On the roads which he
ceaselessly traversed, he regarded with equal abhorrence rapa-
cious toll-collectors and the predatory nobles who swooped down
from their castles on the merchant caravans. In short he was
harassed or annoyed by almost everything in the institutions cre-
ated by a society in which he as yet had only a very small place.50
By the twelfth century, borough charters began, fairly consist-
ently, to grant powers that solved these problems. One borough
power of major importance was the right to hold land in "burgage
tenure." As early as 1100 the obligations of burgage tenure fre-
quently excluded agricultural and other labor services, which were
obviously undesirable to a town-dwelling craftsman or merchant,
and consisted exclusively of money payments. In addition, burgage
tenure entailed fewer restrictions on the sale of land than other
forms of land tenure.51 The burgesses also began with some consis-
tency to gain the right to hold borough courts 52 and the right not to
have to appear in any outside court.53 One example of the conces-
sions gained by charter amply illustrates the problems outside
48. M. BLOCH, supra note 30, at 275-78.
49. Id at 275. The notion of a "borough custom" first appeared in the 12th century.
Reynolds notes that "ft]he customs in force in any town were often more eclectic than the
charters suggest." Some customs dated from Anglo-Saxon times. S. REYNoLDs, Supra note
21, at 95-99.
50. M. BLOCH, supra note 30, at 353-54.
51. S. REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 93.
52. IdL at 102, 119-20.
53. Id. at 101.
378
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courts presented for the merchant burgesses: burgesses won the
right to defend themselves against criminal charges by oath rather
than by battle.54 The charters also established rules governing the
collection of debts and limiting money penalties. 55 Finally, by 1200
many boroughs won freedom from the complex and sometimes
heavy tolls that limited merchants' ability to transport their goods.
56
By 1500 the process of bargaining among the towns, the lords,
and the king made additional borough rights commonplace. Char-
ters now normally included the right to elect members to Parlia-
ment,57 a certain degree of town self-government,58 including the
right to elect a mayor and an alderman,59 and quite extensive rights
to control the economic life of the town.60 Economic control in-
cluded the right to establish monopolies for town merchants as well
as rigorous measures regulating industry and commerce within the
town.
The standard borough charter granted both "public" and "pri-
vate" rights. As Hartog states, "the [borough] charter provided a
continuum of governmental powers running from the almost purely
governmental to the purely private." 6' At one extreme, the charter
established a court structure and granted general regulatory author-
ity to the town officers. At the other extreme, boroughs performed
roles that the law today considers "private." A borough's right to
control entry to trades, which unions exercise today, is but one ex-
ample of borough rights over elements of economic life that today
are traditionally left in the "private" sphere.62 Moreover, a bor-
ough's "public" rights of sovereignty were linked with its "private"
proprietary rights.65 Maitland, as usual, says it best:
A municipal corporation owns a few, but only a few, of the houses
in the town. Over the whole town it exercises a certain govern-
mental power. We have here two different ideas: they can be
sharply contrasted. For one thing, we are accustomed to think
54. Id
55. Id
56. Id at 102, 127.
57. Id. at 111-12.
58. Id at 108-14.
59. Id at 108-09, 120-22.
60. Id at 127-28. Pirenne termed towns' control over economic life "le socialisme
municipale." 1 H. PIRENNE, supra, at 197.
61. H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 19.
62. See S. REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 127-28 (discussing borough control over appren-
tices, craftsmen, and merchants). Feudal society also failed to distinguish between public and
private outside of the borough. Farmers, for example, even when they owned land, were not
at liberty to cultivate it as they pleased. Thejury of the manor court determined the system of
cultivation. J.L. HAMMOND & B. HAMMOND, THE VILLAGE LABOURER 1760-1832, at 6 (1936).
63. F. MArrLAND, TOWNSHIP AND BOROUGH 30 (1898).
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that the governmental power is delegated by the state. The dele-
gation will grow faint as we go backwards. There will be a sort of
lordship over the whole town, and of a few houses there will be
landlordship. . . [In feudal times all] political power exhibits pro-
prietary traits, and every ownership of land is actually or poten-
tially a right of governing and doing justice. . ..
The struggle to separate ownership from rulership was a major
feature of the early modem period. In the seventeenth century, the
development of the nation-state promoted the notion of a "public"
sphere; in the eighteenth century, John Locke and others defined
private rights.6 5 In the late middle ages, however, when the tradi-
tional set of borough powers was defined, no sharp distinction be-
tween public and private as yet existed. Boroughs, therefore,
exhibited a characteristically feudal mixture of public and private
roles. This is the first anachronistic aspect of English corporation
law's feudal logic.6 6
2. The feudal logic of which groups were corporations
The second anachronistic aspect of English corporation law was
the dividing line between the groups that were corporations and the
groups that were not. This division, too, made sense only in rela-
tion to feudal society. The major types of common-law corporations
in England were boroughs, guilds, and universities. 67 To modem
(or even eighteenth century) eyes, these groups have little in com-
mon. From the standpoint of feudal society, however, they shared a
64. Id.
65. See Horwitz, supra note 22, at 1423-24.
66. Hartog identifies the boroughs' mixture of public and private powers as the mixture
of property and governance and explains it as a function of 18th century civic humanism. H.
HARTOG, supra note 8, at 23-24. Hartog may be correct that 18th century New Yorkers would
have explained their city's structure in terms of civic humanism. He skirts, however, a crucial
question by claiming that "[i]n the eighteenth-century context. . . public action could not be
separated from private action." Id at 62. Hartog's statement conflicts with Horwitz's asser-
tion that by the 18th century considerable progress had been made towards formulation of
the public/private distinction in certain contexts. See Horwitz, supra note 26, at 1423. Specifi-
cally, Horwitz's material shows that the national government was viewed as public. Why,
then, did New Yorkers continue to perceive the mix of public and private powers of the city
government as legitimate? See infra note 398 and accompanying text (New York did not ac-
cept public/private dichotomy until 1857).
In order to trace the process of shift from the older view of authority as exercising both
public and private power to the new view in which public and private were viewed as mutually
exclusive spheres, one must identify the "mentality" in which each viewpoint originated. The
mixture of public and private functions in boroughs, as Hartog admits, derived from the feu-
dal mentality. See H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 179-80 (citing F. MAITLAND, supra note 63)
(discussion of feudal boroughs' mix of "lordship" and "landlordship").
67. See supra note 23 (citing Kyd's assertion that guilds were the first corporations). Bor-
oughs were by far the most important. Shepheard, Kyd and the anonymous 1702 Treatise
discuss borough corporations almost exclusively.
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crucial similarity: all had "opted out" of feudal obligations by means
of their charters.
The process through which chartered groups came to be defined
as corporations is obscure. The borough charter that historians tra-
ditionally consider the first "charter of incorporation" dates to
1440.68 Gradually, English law came to view charter grants as
grants of corporate status,69 which gave the "corporation" the so-
called "five points": the right to have perpetual succession, to have a
common seal, to sue and be sued, to hold lands, and to issue by-
laws. 70 But the distinction between the old charter grant and the
new "incorporation" remained unclear. By about 1470 a simple rule
of thumb developed: any borough that paid the "fee farm" was a
corporation.
71
The "fee farm" was the traditional payment that boroughs owed
to the king.72 Kyd noted that formal incorporation required pay-
ment both of the rent to the local lord and the fee farm to the
king.73 Kyd reported that during Queen Elizabeth's reign "the rent
and the farm was the cause of their [the boroughs'] ability to be a
corporation. ' 74 Therefore, if the rent ceased, the corporations
68. M. WEINBAUM, supra note 47, at 65.
69. See generally ia- Lawyers and historians traditionally have oversimplified what "incor-
poration" meant at different periods. Weinbaum is to some extent guilty of this tendency.
Reynolds warns against treating as preclusive and definitional words that were in the middle
ages used "to describe, not to define." S. REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 97.
70. S. REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 113. Reynolds provides a useful discussion of the
development and significance of incorporation:
By the later fifteenth century a charter which would now be considered a charter of
incorporation made a town a fictitious person in the eyes of the law by bestowing on
it the so-called five points. . . . In practice many towns had exercised some or all of
these rights long before and it was only gradually that developing legal theory made
their formal expression useful. . . .By the later fifteenth century the standard form
of incorporation charter gave a town a mayor and aldermen, made the mayor and
others justices of the peace, and laid down rules for election. Clearly the most impor-
tant features of incorporation were not the 'five points' of perpetual succession etc.,
whose significance is largely' the creation of later lawyers and historians, but the
grants of new jurisdiction like the commission of the peace and, even more, the giv-
ing of royal authority to a particular constitution within the town government ....
Here it may be noted that, little as incorporation as such might mean at first, it grad-
ually became common form, so that by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries even
the smallest towns with any pretensions to local independence were becoming incor-
porated, thus giving another gloss to the word borough, as a legally corporate town.
Id. at 113-14; see also id at 116-17 (contending that greater attention to social structures rather
than on academic definitions would yield better understanding of boroughs, communes, and
guilds).
71. M. WEINBAUM, supra note 47, at 58, 88-91. Although Weinbaum reports that any
borough that paid a fee farm was a corporation, he does not comment on the implication that
every feudal charter would automatically be translated into a corporate charter through rigor-
ous application of the rule. Only further research can determine exactly how the rule applied.
72. Id.; S. REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 50, 102-03.
73. 1 S. KYD, supra note 7, at 4-5.
74. Id. at 4. By the late 18th century, Kyd considered this requirement anachronistic, as
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ceased.75 A rule that any borough that paid the fee farm was a cor-
poration meant that any borough with a typical feudal charter be-
came a "corporation."
As feudalism waned, the practice of granting charters to boroughs
ended, and at some point before the eighteenth century the uni-
verse of borough corporations became a closed set. Consequently,
in the eighteenth century many major local government units, in-
cluding the newer urban population centers, were not chartered and
were not incorporated. Only the approximately two hundred "an-
cient boroughs" were corporations. 76 Thus, London and Norwich
were corporations, but Manchester and Birmingham were not. In
addition, few counties and no parishes were corporations. 77
Thus, the logic defining what groups were corporations, which
had made perfect sense in the 1400's, made little sense by 1800.78
As of 1800 political and social theorists had little use for a category
that lumped together universities, guilds, and some towns, while it
excluded other towns and all parishes and counties. As early as
1726, English commentators noted the irrationality of the distinc-
tion between corporations and unincorporated units.79
indeed it was. Id at 4-6. Yet a New York lawyer argued in favor of applying the rule as late as
1828. Town of North Hempstead v. Town of Hempstead, 2 Wend. 109, 117-18 (N.Y. 1828).
75. 1 S. KYD, supra note 7, at 5.
76. B. KErrH-LUcAS, THE UNREFORMED LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM 15 (1980).
77. S. REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 113-14. Some counties were incorporated because
some chartered boroughs had become counties. Id in general, however, counties were not
corporations.
78. I have limited my discussion to aggregate corporations. Corporations, however, in-
cluded both aggregate and sole corporations. Aggregate corporations included universities,
guilds, and boroughs. Sole corporations included the king, archbishops, bishops, and certain
other clerics. Thus, when we consider both aggregate and sole corporations, the dividing line
between corporations and unincorporated units, (a category that included some towns that
could be very similar to incorporated boroughs) made even less sense in relation to early
modern society. See I S. KYD, supra note 7, at 20 (discussing various kinds of corporations).
The importance of the corporate status of sole corporations was that they, like aggregate
corporations, could hold land in perpetual succession. The ability of anyone to hold land in
perpetual succession in feudal society presented a severe threat because feudal incidents were
due at the death of each tenant. T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND
FUTURE INTERESTS 15 (1966).
79. See T. MADox, FIRMA BURGI (London 1726) (comparing incorporated towns with un-
incorporated towns). Professor Teaford suggests that the law's feudal logic was nonetheless
preserved because English courts identified the rights of boroughs with the rights of English-
men and sought to protect borough powers from the "onslaughts" of the Stuart "tyranny." J.
TEAFORD, supra note 11, at 3-15. For rhetoric against the Stuarts, see J.W. WILLCOCK, THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 9 (London 1827) (characterizing Stuart reign as "licen-
tious, tyrannical, and devoid of moral and political virtue").
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B. The Tension in English Corporation Law
Between the Theoretical and the Historical Definitions of a
Corporation
1. The preclusive claims of English corporation law
English corporation law encompasses two definitions of what was
a "corporation." The predominant definition was historical: the
only local government units that were corporations were the closed
set of approximately 200 chartered "ancient boroughs." 80 A com-
pletely independent, theoretical definition of the "corporation,"
however, existed simultaneously in English law. This theoretical ap-
proach viewed corporation law as a framework that enabled a group
to act in concert.8 '
A corporation could act as a group because it was a fictional per-
sonality, a "person in the eye of the law."8 2 In the fifteenth century,
legal scholars attempted to define the "nature" of a corporation in
the scholastic manner. They noted that the corporation was invisi-
ble, of no substance, a mere name, and yet a person.83 They dis-
cussed whether a corporate person could be outlawed or
excommunicated; could be assaulted or imprisoned; could do hom-
age or commit treason or a felony.
84
80. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., I S. KYD, supra note 7, at 3-4. The alternative theoretical basis in English law
that allowed a group to act in concert was trust law, which allowed unincorporated groups to
act through a trustee. 9 W. HoLuswoRTH, supra note 17, at 47-48. •
82. 1 S. KYD, supra note 7, at 16. The idea of defining a group of people as a fictional
personality probably entered England from Continental sources. Though some historians
have said that Pope Innocent IV had made the first known mention of the idea of a fictional
personality in 1263, in fact the idea dates back to Roman times. 3 W. Hot swoRTH, supra
note 17, at 363-64. In England its early development was in the ecclesiastical sphere to solve
the legal question of who owned church property. Id at 364. Bracton, an eminent medieval
jurist of the 13th century, noted that a gift to a church was made in the first place to God and
the saints. Id By the 15th century, such gifts were to "corporations aggregate" (chapters and
monasteries), or "corporations sole" (archbishops, deans, or rectors). These concepts solved
the problem of creating a fictional entity with eternal life capable of holding land. Id. at 362-
65.
83. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 17, at 369.
84. 1 S. KYD, supra note 7, at 70-72; 1702 TREATISE, supra note 18, at 6-7. Blackstone
attributed the statement that corporations have no souls to Sir Edward Coke (1549-1634), the
famous English lawyer. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *477. Early eighteenth century
treatises on corporation law reflect this highly reified approach. The following is from the
second corporations treatise in English, published in 1702:
A Corporation or Incorporation is a body framed by Policy or Fiction of Law, and it's
therefore called a Body Politick; and it's called an Incorporation or a Body incorpo-
rated, because the Persons are made into a Body which endureth in perpetual Suc-
cession; and are of Capacity to grant, sue or be sued, and the like. The Opinion of
Chief Baron Manwood is odly [sic] express'd. Corporations are invisible, and immor-
tal, and have no Soul; and therefore no Subpoena lies against them, because they have
no Conscience nor Soul. None can create Souls but God. ...
1702 TREATISE, supra note 18, at 2.
Kyd subjected such quasi-scholastic speculations to typical Enlightenment ridicule. 1 S.
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The early modern scholars defined the corporation in theoretical
terms.8 5 At first this probably presented few problems. In theory,
corporation analysis could have extended to any group that fit the
reified definition of a corporation. English lawyers, however, even-
tually came to analyze only the closed set of historically defined enti-
ties as corporations.86 This approach created a dilemma when later
theoreticians changed the term "corporation" from a descriptive
term into a preclusive one. Moreover, the general principle that
corporations could hold land and sue and be sued as a group because
they were persons in the eye of the law, became an assertion that
only groups that were "persons in the eye of the law" could hold
land and sue and be sued as a group.8 7 As a result, English corpora-
tion law by the seventeenth century appeared to hold that a very
broad range of groups in England, from unchartered towns to coun-
ties and parishes, could not exercise corporate powers.
Legal commentators noted the incongruity of the corporation
law's preclusive claims as soon as they started examining the rules of
corporations as a cohesive body of law. Thomas Madox's Firma
Burgi, published in 1726,88 discussed the preclusive claims of corpo-
ration law at length, and attempted to discredit them. Madox
stressed the similarities between corporate and noncorporate towns:
both were characterized by perpetual succession, holding at farm,
paying common duties, manner of answering, and denomination.8 9
Stewart Kyd, in 1793, relied heavily on Madox, but Kyd altered
Madox's analysis in a crucial way. Kyd stressed the preclusive claims
of corporation law by stating that unincorporated towns used to ex-
ercise corporate powers, implying that they did (or should) no
KYn, supra note 7, at 71. He reported a long list of corporate characteristics but then noted
that the corporation was explicable "without having recourse to the quaint observations fre-
quent in the old books, that [a corporation] exists merely in idea, and that it has neither soul
nor body." Id at 71. Kyd agreed with the 1702 author's recognition that the corporation
"rests only in the intendment and consideration of law," 1702 TREATISE, supra note 18, at 6,
but Kyd followed through the implications of that opinion and argued that it makes little
sense to act as if the nature of a corporation entails a mere matter of logical deduction from
first principles if the corporation is a creature of policy. 1 S. KYD, supra note 7, at 71.
85. For examples, see 9 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 17, at 49-53.
86. Incorporation became less and less common during the course of the 17th century.
M. WEINBAUM, supra note 47, at 99. For lists of English boroughs and their dates of incorpo-
ration, see id at 127-37.
87. The ability to hold land as a group and to sue and be sued as a group became the two
most important corporate privileges because unincorporated groups (as well as corporations)
could pass by-laws in certain circumstances. See infra notes 96-126 and accompanying text
(discussing alternate bases of local government power).
88. T. MADox, supra note 79.
89. Id at 37. "Farm" refers to the fee farm. See supra text accompanying note 72. "Man-
ner of answering" refers to the ability to sue and be sued as a group.
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longer do so.90
Similarly, Kyd pointed out that "in ancient times" unincorporated
groups could hold land and transmit it to their successors, but that
this was no longer the case.9 1 In formalizing a distinction between
incorporated and unincorporated groups, Kyd formalized English
corporation law's preclusive claims:
There seems, indeed, no reason in the nature of things, why such
grants should not have been allowed; there is certainly no meta-
physical difficulty attending the transmission of landed property
through a series of individuals in their collective capacity, without
the support of a positive institution: It has, however, been long an
established maxim of the English law, that land, granted to a com-
munity or aggregate body of men, not incorporated, cannot, by
virtue of the original grant alone, be transmitted to their
successors .92
2. Alternative bases of local government powers in England
By the end of the seventeenth century, the importance of English
boroughs was waning.93 The county and the parish, much more im-
portant local government units than boroughs in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, were unincorporated. 9 4 But only corpora-
tions could exercise corporate powers, which included not only the
ability to hold lands and other property and to sue and be sued, but
also the ability to pass by-laws, as local ordinances were called. The
existence of a series of alternative legal concepts gave parishes,
counties, and unincorporated towns authority to act in their as-
signed regulatory and service-provision roles even though they were
not corporations.9 5 These concepts also moderated the dissonance
90. 1 S. KYD, supra note 7, at 3-4, 10. Kyd stated that
It is another characteristic of the corporation, that it is capable in its collective capac-
ity of processing property, and transmitting it in perpetual succession; but this, in
ancient times, was not peculiar to a corporation: Madox, in his Firma Burgi. . ., gives a
variety of instances, of towns not corporate, holding their town at ferm in the same
manner as towns corporate. . . . Another characteristic of a corporation is, that it
may sue and be sued in its collective capacity; but in ancient times there are many
instances of other collective bodies suing and being sued in the same manner.
Id- (emphasis added).
91. Id at 5-6 (quoting Lord Coke).
92. Id (emphasis in original).
93. 2 B. & S. WEBB, THE MANOR AND THE BOROUGH, 7-8 (1963).
94. 1 B. & S. WEBB, THE PARISH AND THE CouNTrypassim (1963).
95. Although scholars such as Maitland and Holdsworth devote substantial attention to
the history of English corporation law, see supra notes 17, 40, & 66, no similar literature exists
on the alternative basis of local government powers in England. Some legal doctrines that
developed in the context of towns, however, played important roles in America. An example
is the development in New York of the doctrine of corporations for a particular purpose. See
infra text accompanying notes 110-17 & 183-240.
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between the preclusive claims of English corporation law and the
necessities of local governance.
One alternative basis for governmental authority was the right to
act pursuant to custom. Many corporate boroughs possessed im-
portant rights by custom. 96 But the right to act pursuant to custom
was not limited to incorporated groups. According to the 1628 edi-
tion of Coke on Littleton, "an upland Towne [an, unincorporated
group] may allege a custome to have a way to their church, or to
make By-lawes for the reparations of the Church, the well ordering
of the Commons and such like things." 97
Borough customs involved both political and economic rights.
Medieval towns and villages had existed in a fundamentally agricul-
tural society. Their customs, therefore, tended to involve agricul-
tural rights, such as the right to make by-laws for "the well ordering
of the Commons and such like Things," as, for example, a by-law
that "none shall put his beasts to the common field before such a
day .. ."98 Other rights included town powers to pass by-laws con-
cerning matters of the forest and customs concerning fishing. An
English town, for example, adopted a by-law that provided "that
none shall kill salmons at certain seasons of the year, and so of other
fishes." 99
Thus towns and villages had by custom the authority to take the
basic actions necessary for the maintenance of village life-"the
sowing of crops, the maintenance of local bridges and footpaths,
and the care of straying animals."' 100 Yet these customary powers
had limited utility because they were backward looking: they could
not provide the basis for new duties thrust on local government
units in the early modern age.
A second, but apparently little-used basis of local government
power was a town's or parish's power to act "pro bono publico"
without any custom to support its by-law. Commentators occasion-
ally described this power in broad terms. According to Kyd:
[tlhe inhabitants of a town not incorporated may, without any cus-
tom to authorize them, make a by-law for the repair of a church,
or of a highway, or concerning any thing which the public good
requires to be regulated; and in such a case the majority shall bind
96. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing custom as authority).
97. E. COKE, CoKE ON LrrrrON 110b (London 1628). These unincorporated "upland"
towns, however, could not devise lands by custom. Id
98. 13 By-law, 1 Gould 79, 75 Eng. Rep. 1007 (1588); see also Lord Crumwell's Case, 3
Dyer 321b, 73 Eng. Rep. 727 (K.B. 1573) (upholding by-law limitations on cattle pasturing).
99. Chamberlain of London's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 626, 77 Eng. Rep. 150 (K.B. 1591).
100. K.B. SMELUE, A HISTORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 11 (1968).
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the whole.' 0 '
It appears, however, that this doctrine in fact applied only when sus-
taining town and parish powers to repair churches and highways.'
0 2
The most important local government unit in seventeenth century
England was not the town but the parish. The parish, a traditional
institution with deep medieval roots, gained new importance in
early modern times as monarchs from the Tudors onward imposed
new duties on English parishes, ranging from the repair of roads
and bridges to oversight of the poor.'
0 3
The most important parish officers were the churchwardens,
whose obligations included repair and maintenance of the church
and provision of the materials necessary for church services.10 4 The
most far-reaching duty of churchwardens was their customary re-
sponsibility to act "as a sort of inspector of the morals of the peo-
ple."' 1 5 In addition, although Parliament created officers to take
primary responsibility for care of the poor and the highways, both
the "Overseers of the Poor" and the local "Surveyor" were gener-
ally affiliated with the parish.
0 6
A second important parish institution was the vestry meeting. In
many ways analogous to the New England town meetings (for which
they served as a model), vestry meetings allowed parishioners to ex-
ercise a very broad range of regulatory and taxing powers.
Within the scope and jurisdiction of the inhabitants in Vestry as-
sembled there lay the provision of practically any service, and the
enactment of practically any regulation that the majority of the
parishioners might think desirable, whether in the management of
the church or of the secular institutions of the parish; whether in
education, sanitation, or recreation; whether in the relief of the
poor, the prevention of crime, or the provision of additional
churches and clergy. To carry out any of their objects, the parish-
ioners could not only hold property in trust and receive gifts but
could also levy on all householders a series of rates unlimited in
amount, and varied in incidence so as to include personalty as well
as real estate.'
0 7
101. 1 S. KYD, supra note 7, at 96.
102. See, e.g., Rogers v. Davenant, 1 Mod. Rep. 236, 236, 86 Eng. Rep. 852, 853 (K.B.
1678); By-laws, 3 Salk. 76, 91 Eng. Rep. 701-02 (1795).
103. K.B. SMELUE, supra note 100, at 12; 1 B. & S. WEBB, supra note 94, at 10-11.
104. 1 B. & S. WEBB, supra note 94, at 20.
105. Id at 21 n.l (quoting E.T. VAUGHAN, SOME AccouNT OF THE REV. THOMAS ROBINSON
110 (1815)).
106. 1 B. & S. WEBB, supra note 94, at 29. Parliament added these officers to the parish as
assistants to the constables and churchwardens. Id
107. Jad at 146-47. Although the vestry was unincorporated, the meeting could hold prop-
erty by means of the trust, a practice that New York adopted. See infra notes 185-88 and
accompanying text (discussing use of trusteeship).
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English parishes themselves were not corporations. Neither were
churchwardens, Overseers of the Poor, Surveyors, nor the vestry
meeting itself, because none of these groups had ever been
chartered. Their legal ability to act in concert, to hold land and
other property, to sue and be sued, and to pass by-laws, therefore,
presented theoretical difficulties by the seventeenth century in the
face of the preclusive claims of English corporation law. Several
grounds emerged to support the powers they exercised.
One basis for the powers of parish officers was the direct authority
that statutes conferred on them to perform specific duties. Between
1530 and 1562 Parliament passed statutes making parishes respon-
sible for bridges and highways.' 08 In 1601 Parliament gave parish
overseers responsibility for the administration of the poor laws.109
A potentially broader legal basis for parish powers derived from
the common-law doctrine that churchwardens were "corporations
for a particular purpose." This doctrine provided that although
churchwardens were not full corporations they could exercise a lim-
ited number of corporate powers in connection with their duties to
hold the parish's personal property. Because churchwardens could
hold personal property "as a corporation," the "corporate" prop-
erty passed automatically to the successor churchwardens rather
than to the personal heirs of the prior occupant of the office.
Churchwardens also could bring lawsuits in connection with the
church property. In 1724 a court explained that "the churchwar-
dens were a corporation, and might sell the church bells or silence
them, and make a reasonable agreement beneficial for the parish,
and thereby bind the parishioners and their successors as also the
succeeding churchwardens." 110
Kyd considered churchwardens a special kind of corporation.
With respect to churchwardens, Kyd wrote that "[t]here are also
some corporations which have a corporate capacity to some particu-
lar purpose.""' Kyd stressed that churchwardens did not exercise
general corporate powers; for example, they could not hold land as
a corporation. 1 2 He added, however, that although the corporate
capacity of a churchwarden was limited, a statute could grant a
108. K.B. SMELLIE, supra note 100, at 12.
109. Id The Webbs give the year that Parliament established the overseers of the poor as
1597. 1 B. & S. WEBB, supra note 94, at 30. Other statutes imposed on the parish the respon-
sibility to repress drunkenness and unlicensed ale-houses. Id. at 21 n.2.
110. Martin v. Nutkin, 24 Eng. Rep. 724 (1724).
111. 1 S. KYD, supra note 7, at 29.
112. Id at 31; see also Fawkners Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 854 (C.P. 1627) (invalidating grant of
land to churchwarden because he lacked corporate power to hold land).
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churchwarden "a more enlarged capacity."" 53
The concept that churchwardens were "corporations for a partic-
ular purpose," as the doctrine came to be known, was but one in-
stance of a tendency in English law to hold that, if a group exercised
a power supposedly limited to corporations, "to this purpose they
are a corporation."'1 14 This doctrine served to mute the contradic-
tions between the preclusive claims of English corporation law and
the exercise by many unincorporated groups of "corporate" powers
which, according to legal theory, only corporations could exercise.
The corporation-for-a-particular-purpose analysis also appears to
have been used to explain the broad powers of vestry meetings. In
the seventeenth century, challenges arose to the meetings' legal
authority:
The duly summoned town "meetings" or Vestry meeting had an
undefined right to make by-laws on matters of parish concern,
which were binding all parishioners, whether they consented or
not, or whether or not they were present .... This by-law mak-
ing power was warranted only by immemorial custom, recognized
by the law courts from earliest times, but beginning, in 1689, in
the rare cases in which it was questioned, to be supported with
some hesitation and dubiety. 15
One way in which the courts re-explained vestry meetings' powers
was to assert that the meetings had the power to make by-laws be-
cause they were corporations. One court, for example, asserted in
1675 that although only Parliament could impose a tax, "the greater
part of the parish can make a by-law; and to this purpose they are a
corporation."" 16
The argument that vestry meetings and churchwardens could ex-
ercise certain powers because they were in some sense "corpora-
tions" raised the obvious question of whether other groups were the
kind of "corporations" that should be able to exercise other "corpo-
rate" powers."17 In 1788 a court addressed this issue in Russell v.
The Men Dwelling in the County of Devon. "18 The case involved a suit by
113. IS. KYD, supra note 7, at 31.
114. Rogers v. Davenant, 1 Mod. Rep. 194, 194, 86 Eng. Rep. 823, 823 (K.B. 1675).
115. 1 B. & S. WEBB, supra note 94, at 39.
116. Rogers v. Davenant, 1 Mod. Rep. 194, 194, 86 Eng. Rep. 823, 823 (K.B. 1675). The
churchwarden was, however, not allowed to levy a tax.
117. The statement that a parish could undertake certain actions because it was a corpora-
tion for the purpose is, of course, not really an explanation: the statement is circular. See
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 809-14
(1935) (discussing tautological characteristics of corporation definitions).
118. 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788) [hereinafter cited as Russell v. Men of
Devon]. Historians have commonly asserted that Men of Devon was of major importance in
England. E.g., H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 189. In fact, Men of Devon never played the impor-
tant role in England that it played in America. In America, Massachusetts courts cited it for
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a plaintiff whose wagon suffered injury "in consequence of a bridge
being out of repair."11 9 The county clearly had the duty to keep the
bridge in repair, but its attorney argued that the county was not lia-
ble because it could not sue or be sued:
Consider, first who are the necessary parties to all civil suits; they
must either be brought against individuals who are to be particu-
larly named or against corporations, or against persons who are
rendered liable by the provisions of particular Acts of Parliament:
if it be brought against individuals, all of them must be brought
before the Court and they must appear before the Court or be
outlawed. This mode of bringing actions against large bodies of
men would render nugatory the privileges of the Crown of creat-
ing corporations, and would destroy the mode of suing corpora-
tions in their corporate capacity.'
20
Plaintiff's counsel based his argument in favor of county liability
on various statutes that made unincorporated hundreds liable for
damages in certain circumstances.' 2 1 By analogy, he claimed that
the county, although admittedly not a corporation, should be held
liable. 122 In effect, plaintiff's counsel asked the court to give to
counties the corporate power that Parliament had given to other en-
tities by statute.
ChiefJudge Kenyon abruptly refused to accede to this innovation.
He wrote that
[i]f this experiment had succeeded, it would have been productive
of an infinity of actions. And though the fear of introducing so
much litigation ought not to prevent plaintiff's recovering, if by
the proposition that unincorporated towns were a special type of "quasi corporation." See
infra note 322 and accompanying text. New York courts cited Men of Devon for the proposition
that even unincorporated towns could exercise certain corporate powers. E.g., Todd v. Bird-
sail, 1 Cow. 260, 261 n.c. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823). In England Men of Devon merely prevented
plaintiffs from naming unincorporated groups as defendants: plaintiffs had to sue the mem-
bers of the group individually if at all. See, e.g., 1 H. GwiLLiM, BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT, 50 (6th
ed. London 1807) (inhabitants of district not liable to suit as a group unless Act of Parliament
renders them liable) (citing Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B.
1788)).
119. Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 359 (K.B. 1788).
120. Id. at 668, 100 Eng. Rep. at 359.
121. Hundreds were units of Anglo-Saxon origin. H. JEWELL, ENGLISH LOCAL ADMINIS-
TRATION IN THE MIDDLE AGES 47 (1972). Jewell notes that
[h]istorians have debated whether these units actually sprang from an ancient, conve-
nient assessment of land into areas of approximately a hundred hides, or from an
early association of a hundred heads of families in a police group, or from the tenth-
century necessity for units on which defence burdens could be imposed.
Id That hundreds remained unchartered shows how the preclusive claims of corporation law
"cut across the older rules which allowed many powers to unincorporate groups." 4 W.
HoLDswoRTH, supra note 17, at 477-78.
122. Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 670, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 361 (K.B. 1788). The
plaintiff's attorney asserted that the county was seeking merely "to shelter themselves under
forms of law." Id.
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law he is entitled, yet it ought to have considerable weight in a
case where it is admitted that there is no precedent of such an
action having been before attempted. . . [T]he question here is,
whether this body of men, who are sued in the present action, are
a corporation, or quasi a corporation against whom such an action
can be maintained.' 2
3
Having made it clear that he refused to accept the plaintiff's invi-
tation to abandon traditional corporation law, Kenyon stated that he
would not exercise "a legislative discretion in this case," making
what was basically a separation of powers argument:
[I]t has been said that this action ought to be maintained by bor-
rowing the rules of analogy from the statutes [giving hundreds the
right to sue and be sued]. . . but I think that those statutes prove
the very reverse . . . [I]t was never imagined that the hundred
could have been compelled to make satisfaction . . till the stat-
ute gave that remedy.'
24
Men of Devon presented an opportunity to resolve the tension be-
tween English corporation law's preclusive claims and the fact that
most important local government units were unincorporated by the
eighteenth century. 125 The court declined the invitation and reaf-
firmed the preclusive claims of English corporation law.
126
Parliament, not the courts, finally resolved the tension between
the corporation law and the local government institutions.' 27 Any
discussion of doctrinal change in English law must begin with the
observation that English judges have not traditionally felt as free as
their American counterparts to effect doctrinal change.'
28 Of
course, English judges have sometimes changed their law, despite
protestations to the contrary. Yet the English courts' refusal to
broaden the definition of the corporation is hardly surprising con-
sidering the political implications of such a decision in England.
One attribute of borough status since the fifteenth century had been
the right to representation in Parliament. 2 9 By the turn of the nine-
teenth century, the resulting system gave parliamentary representa-
tion to boroughs, but completely denied representation to major
123. Id. at 671-72, 100 Eng. Rep. at 361-62. The report indicates that the court actually
interrupted the lawyer's argument and refused to let him go on. Id. at 671, 100 Eng. Rep. at
362.
124. Id. at 672, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362.
125. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (noting primacy of county as local political
authority).
126. Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 673, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (K.B. 1788).
127. See K.B. SMELLIE, supra note 100, at 31-33 (discussing passage of the Municipal Cor-
porations Act of 1835).
128. The House of Lords decided only in 1966 that Englishjudges were not always bound
by precedent. J.H. BAKER, INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 175 (1979).
129. S. REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 111-12.
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cities such as Birmingham and Manchester. Courts understandably
avoided involvement in this increasingly controversial issue. Ulti-
mately Parliament resolved the controversy by passing the Munici-
pal Corporations Act of 1835, which restructured the distribution of
political power on a national scale. Thus, Parliament and not the
judiciary made the shift from borough to municipal corporation in
England. 30
II. ENGLISH CORPORATION LAW IN AMERICA
The problems that the preclusive claims of English corporation
law created were potentially greater in America than in England. In
England the dissonance between the law's preclusive claims and
political reality was moderated; first, by the existence of a substan-
tial number of boroughs to which corporation law granted substan-
tial powers, but more importantly, by the alternative legal bases that
justified the power of unincorporated local government units.
America faced English law's preclusive claims without these buffers.
After the Revolution, New York City was the only major chartered
borough in the United States.' 3' Moreover, many American courts
were generally hostile to claims of authority based on "custom."'
3 2
American courts thus confronted the full force of English corpora-
tion law's preclusive claims.
Unlike English judges, however, American judges in the post-Rev-
olutionary period generally felt quite free to change the law to suit
American needs.133 Courts in both Massachusetts and New York ul-
timately changed English corporation law by 1850, but the process
occurred quite differently in the two states. In New York the Eng-
lish law did not strike lawyers as obsolete. On the contrary, New
Yorkers accepted New York City's mixture of public and private
roles, and continued to view the dividing line between the Corpora-
tion of the City of New York and unincorporated towns as an obvi-
ous and commonsense distinction.13 4 Thus New York courts in the
period between 1800 and 1830 refused to hold that unincorporated
130. Parliament passed the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 as part of a wave of re-
form in the first part of the 19th century, K.B. SMELLE, supra note 100, at 22-34, 41-46.
131. See supra note I 1 (discussing New York's legal position after Revolution).
132. See M. HoRwr-z, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1-30 (1977) (discussing
American judges' use of English precedent).
133. Idl
134. Hartog shows how during the course of the 19th century, as the modem pub-
lic/private distinction gained acceptance, New Yorkers reconceptualized the city as "a schizo-
phrenic personality" that was a partly private corporation and a partly public authority. H.
HARTOG, supra note 8, at 79-80. The continuing perception of New York judges that New
York City was both public and private, however, stands in sharp contrast to the Massachusetts
courts' perception that Massachusetts towns were purely public. See infra notes 372-82 and
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New York towns were "corporations." Because New York courts
preserved the "preclusive" historical definition of corporations as
chartered boroughs, they continued to struggle with the question of
whether New York's towns and villages were corporations.
In sharp contrast, courts in Massachusetts found the traditional
dividing line between corporations and unincorporated units un-
convincing. This perception enabled them to mobilize the theoreti-
cal definition of "incorporation" and conclude that Massachusetts
towns were a new type of "municipal corporation."
A. English Corporation Law in New York
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, New York City's legal
status was that of a corporate borough,13 5 and courts applied Eng-
lish corporation law virtually unchanged in cases involving New
York City.'3 6 New York courts also adhered closely to English pre-
cedent in cases involving the status of other local government enti-
ties, notably towns and villages. The courts were under
considerable pressure to hold that towns and other local govern-
ment entities were corporations because, if they were not, the
preclusive claims of English corporation law would have raised seri-
ous questions about their ability to hold land and to sue and be
sued. The only way to establish a firm basis for town powers was to
hold that towns were corporations. New York courts, however, were
reluctant to do so.
The New York courts' obstinancy stemmed from the substantial
differences between towns and corporations (i.e. boroughs) such as
New York City. Towns and villages differed from the Corporation
of the City of New York in two major ways. First, towns and villages
did not have the peculiar mixture of public and private powers char-
accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts' characterization of municipal corporations as
public entities).
135. See H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 13-32.
136. See, e.g., Hart v. Mayor of Albany, 9 Wend. 571, 588-90 (N.Y. 1832) (city ordinance
upheld by court as within the scope of corporations' traditionally broad incidental powers); In
re DeWint, I Cow. 595, 595 (N.Y. 1828) (using corporation as preclusive description of New
York City); Furman v. Knapp, 19 Johns. 248, 258 (N.Y. 1821) (applying traditional liberal
construction to corporation's charter); Mayor of New York v. Ordrenan, 12 Johns. 122, 124
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815) (recognizing corporations' broad incidental powers); Cortelyou v. Van
Brundt, I Johns. 313, 314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806) (citizens and those "made free of the city" are
exempted from jury duty); LeRoy v. Mayor of New York, 4Johns. Ch. 352, 354-55 (N.Y. Ch.
1820) (court cited English precedent to determine the breadth of New York City's equity
jurisdiction over sewer assessment). For discussion of the English corporation doctrines ap-
plied in these cases, see 1 S. KyD, supra note 7, at 69-70 (discussing corporations' incidental
powers); W. SHEPHEARD, supra note 18, at 44 (discussing advantages of charter corporations);
J.W. WiLLcocx, supra note 79, at 159 (discussing ordinance-making power incident to munici-
pal incorporation); 1702 TRrA'ISE, supra note 18, at 209 (discussing incidence of
incorporation).
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acteristic of corporate boroughs. Second, and perhaps more signifi-
cantly, towns and villages had a very different relationship to the
state than corporate boroughs. In the early nineteenth century,
charter inviolability provisions in the New York State Constitution
kept New York City's charter rights immune from state intru-
sions. 137 If courts had held that towns and villages were corpora-
tions, their traditional rights might also have been protected from
state intrusion. This conclusion would have conflicted with the
traditional concept of the limited powers of New York localities.
Thus New York courts were adamant that towns were not corpora-
tions. They were much less certain what towns were. New York
courts remained mired in confusion about the legal status of New
York towns for decades after Massachusetts courts had concluded
that Massachusetts towns were municipal corporations.
This section first provides background information necessary for
an understanding of the New York courts' refusal to hold that towns
were corporations. A discussion of the state constitutional provi-
sion that protected New York City's charter rights is followed by a
description of the traditional legal status of towns and villages. The
section then outlines the New York courts' struggle from 1810 until
after 1830 to resolve the corporate status of towns and villages.
1. Charter inviolability in New York
The principle that the sovereign could not alter or rescind a bor-
ough's charter without the corporation's consent grew out of the
struggles between English boroughs and Stuart kings in seventeenth
century England.138 The principle persisted in New York even after
the 1819 dictum of the Dartmouth College case' 39 that the state had
broad powers over the charters of "public corporations."' 140
Although the charter inviolability principle did not effectively pro-
tect New York City's traditional privileges,' 41 the doctrine did play a
central role in New York law throughout the first half of the nine-
teenth century. Its importance was primarily reflected in New York
lawyers' arguments over whether towns were corporations. 42
137. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXVI; N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § IX.; see infra note
143 & 155 and accompanying text (discussing charter provisions).
138. SeeJ. LEVIN, THE CHARTER CONTROVERSY AND THE CITY OF LONDON (1969) (analyzing
the legal consequences of Charles I's attack on the violability of London's charter).
139. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
140. Id. at 629-30; see infra notes 146-54 and accompanying text (discussing impact of
Dartmouth College on New York law).
141. See infra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing New York City's reliance on
state statutes, not charter, for legislative and regulatory authority).
142. Because Hartog does not provide a full discussion of charter inviolability, this section
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After the Declaration of Independence, the Corporation of the
City of New York lost no time in ensuring that its charter rights,
which were originally granted by the English king, would continue
to be protected from intrusions by its new sovereign. A provision in
the New York State Constitution of 1777 stated that "nothing
herein contained shall be construed to annul any charters politic
granted by the king of Great Britain."',43 In the years immediately
after the Revolution, the legislature changed New York City's char-
ter without its consent only once, to broaden the franchise in the
city. 14 4 An 1815 case involving New York City referred to "the al-
most invariable course of proceeding of the legislature not to inter-
fere in the internal concerns of a corporation, without its
consent."1
45
Four years later, the United States Supreme Court decided the
Dartmouth College case. 146 At issue was the New Hampshire legisla-
ture's attempt to change Dartmouth College's charter without its
consent. The Court held that the legislature could not change the
charter because the charter of a private corporation was a contract
and, therefore, a vested property right. 147 From the viewpoint of
local government law, however, the crucial feature of Dartmouth Col-
lege was dicta in both the majority opinion 148 and in Justice Story's
concurrence that distinguished between private corporations, which
were protected by the doctrine of charter inviolability, and public
corporations, the charters of which could perhaps be changed by the
legislature. 149
In New York, Story's dictum raised questions concerning whether
New York City's charter rights were still inviolable. An 1821 case,
Furman v. Knapp,150 illustrated the considerable confusion that
Dartmouth College engendered. The case involved a grocery store
owner who had sold liquor under a New York City license but with-
out a license from the state.' 5' The city argued that its charter gave
discusses the relevant constitutional provisions as well as the dedsions of New York courts
and their relationship to Dartmouth College.
143. N.Y. CoNsr. of 1777, art. XXVI.
144. SeeJ. TEAFORD, supra note 11, at 74, 85-89 (discussing politics surrounding New York
City's franchise expansion). For an argument citing this change in New York City's charter as
precedent for a further change, seeJackson v. Nestles, 3Johns. 115, 129 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
145. Mayor of New York v. Ordrenan, 12 Johns. 122, 125 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815).
146. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
147. Id. at 650. Article I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution declares that "[n]o State shall...
pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 10.
148. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 629-30
(1819).
149. Id. at 668-69, 675-76 (Story, J., concurring).
150. 19 Johns. 248 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821).
151. Id at 249.
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the city exclusive jurisdiction over the sale of liquor within its lim-
its; 152 the state's attorney cited Dartmouth College to support his con-
tention that the state could rescind New York City's charter power at
will.153
The court in Furman clearly wanted to avoid the charter inviolabil-
ity issue. It upheld the state's regulatory power without expressly
rejecting the doctrine of charter inviolability. Instead, the court em-
ployed a legal fiction:
If the charter of the city of New-York, authorizing the Mayor to
grant licenses, was not altered by the statute, as I think it was not;
... . Then it follows that there was a concurrent jurisdiction
... . It seems to me that we give full effect to the charter, by
saying, that the power and authority of the Mayor yet exists in full
force; and we are bound to say, that the statutory provision re-
mains unaffected by the charter, because we are bound to presume
that the statute was passed with the assent of the corporation. It
then turns out, that the charter requires a license from the Mayor,
and the statute requires a license from the [state] Commission
also; and the only inconvenience that retailer is subject to, is the
necessity of obtaining both.'
5 4
New York's constitutional convention of 1821 adopted a new invi-
olability provision that required the assent of two-thirds of each
house of the legislature to pass any bill that altered the rights of
"any body politic or corporate."' 55 Although the provision sought
to slow "the too rapid multiplication of bank charters, and the legis-
lative corruption which their creation induced,"' 56 by its terms it
covered all corporations, and evidence exists that the legislature in-
tended the provision to include chartered cities and villages.
1 57
As a practical matter, New York City's power over its internal af-
fairs was eroded by the city's tendency to turn to the state for spe-
cific regulatory authority.' 58 Yet the doctrine of charter inviolability
152. Id. at 257.
153. Id at 249. The state's attorney was apparently not completely comfortable citing the
Dartmouth College dictum ofJustice Story's concurrence, see supra notes 148-49 and accompany-
ing text, to support his claim concerning the rescindability of a city charter. The attorney,
instead, primarily relied on the more traditional argument that New York City had acquiesced
to a change in its charter and had therefore given up its charter power to license liquor sales.
Furman v. Knapp, 19Johns. 248, 250 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821). The grocer's counsel, however,
felt equally uncomfortable challenging the dictum from Dartmouth College; he too sidestepped
the issue of charter inviolability. Id at 252-53. Instead, the attorney argued that the court
could decide the case without reaching the charter inviolability rule by asserting that the legis-
lature had made no explicit attempt to amend the charter. Id.
154. Id at 258-59 (emphasis added).
155. N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § IX.
156. Purdy v. People, 4 Hill 384, 398 (N.Y. 1842).
157. Id at 397.
158. See H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 126-42 (discussing city's reliance on state authority
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continued to protect the city's traditional charter rights in its 1821
form. As discussed in a subsequent section, the doctrine played a
central role in cases involving the question of whether New York
towns were corporations. 159 New York courts' steadfast refusal to
hold that towns were corporations was due in part to the recogni-
tion that, if towns and villages were corporations, they would be
protected from state authority by the 1821 charter inviolability
provision.
2. The traditional status of New York's towns and villages
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the major local gov-
ernment units in New York were counties, towns, and villages.'
60
The county played a predominant role in New York's local govern-
ment. During the colonial period, New Yorkers focused their desire
to manage their own local affairs on attempts to institute and pre-
serve the county structure.' 6 ' One of the first laws that the New
York General Assembly passed divided New York into twelve coun-
ties.162 Counties exercised very substantial governmental powers'
63
and were the units of representation in the New York Assembly.1
64
New York counties gradually assumed a predominance that English
counties had exercised in theory but not in practice.'
65
for political and legislative action). Coates v. Mayor of New York, 7 Cow. 585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1827), demonstrates the legal doctrines at work. The case involved New York City's authority
to regulate cemeteries. The city initially had had a charter right to regulate cemeteries, but a
subsequent state act had expanded its charter authority. Id. at 585. Although the city first
argued that it had the requisite regulatory power under its charter, it quickly conceded that its
dependence on the charter was inapposite, agreeing "that we cannot go back to the charter;
but must rely for our power on the statute." Id at 588 (citing Furman v. Knapp, 19 Johns.
248 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821)). The city added that "[t]hat part of our declaration referring to our
charter may be striken out as surplusage." Coates v. Mayor of New York, 7 Cow. at 593. The
city was caught in a dilemma: the more it turned to the state for specific grants of regulatory
power, the more vulnerable it became to state control.
159. See infra notes 183-247 and accompanying text.
160. There were a very limited number of corporate boroughs as well.
161. Varga, The Development and Structure of Local Government in Colonial New York, in TowN
AND CouNTY 194 (B. Daniels ed. 1978). In 1683 New Yorkers were demanding not only the
rights of Englishmen but also adherence to English governmental structure. New Yorkers did
not want gradual dispersion of governmental powers by means of town charters because the
state could use such grants to bolster the influence of the central administration; instead, New
Yorkers wanted the immediate establishment of county autonomy. Id.
162. Act of Oct. 1, 1691, ch. 17, 1 THE COLONIAL LAws OF NEW YORK FROM THE YAR 1664
TO THE REVOLUTION 267 (1894); see also Varga, supra note 161, at 197 (discussing New York's
affinity for county authority).
163. See Varga, supra note 161, at 197-206 (discussing county power to choose officials).
The county court was a major county institution. In addition, a variety of officials were ap-
pointed at the county level, such as county clerk, coroner, and surrogates who dealt with
testamentary matters. The highest elective county officers, the board of supervisors, exer-
cised substantial ordinance-making and administrative functions. Id
164. Id. at 197-203.
165. Id at 203. Varga stresses New York counties' powers. Id Although counties were
thought of as the major unit of local government in England, parishes exercised substantial
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New York subdivided its counties into townships.' 66 These town-
ships were by no means identical to New England towns. A board of
six to twelve "trustees,"'167 elected by the "inhabitants and freehold-
ers" at a single annual meeting, governed the township.16 8 As the
town supervisors' title implies, New York towns turned to the
"trust" rather than the corporation to provide the legal basis for
their actions.' 69 The "trust" concept made sense for towns in New
York because lawyers there, like lawyers in England, had a very con-
crete notion of what was a corporation, and they knew that their
towns were not corporations.' 70 Thus, when New York passed a
statute to create new townships and counties on a regular basis in
1788, the statute did not "incorporate" towns. 17' In contrast to the
Massachusetts statutes that "incorporated" towns in the late eight-
eenth century, 72 the 1788 New York act carefully avoided "corpo-
rate" language. It was merely "[a]n Act for dividing the counties of
this State into towns." 173
The 1788 statute formally "erected" a long list of towns and au-
thorized the towns to choose various officials at town meetings. 174
authority in practice. I B. & S. WEBB, supra note 94, at 279-80. During the colonial period,
New York counties took on tasks that counties had not performed in England. See Varga, supra
note 161, at 197-206 (discussing substantial authority of New York towns).
166. Bonomi, Local Government in Colonial New York: A Base for Republicanism, in EARLY NEW
YORK Socir & PoLrrcs 29, 32 (1974). In rural areas, counties were sometimes divided into
"precincts" rather than townships. Id
167. Id at 32. Bonomi's article is a case study of the Township of Kingston, New York in
the early 18th century. Bonomi claims that trustees governed Kingston, meeting formally
seven to nine times a year. The trustees' largest single responsibility was to grant land, but
they also addressed a wide variety of other issues, including supervising construction, levying
fines, paying bills, and adopting certain ordinances. Id at 42-43.
168. Id at 32. Bonomi suggests that although additional "special" town meetings took
place, there is no evidence that they were very frequent or that the meetings at Kingston
played as important a civic role as did the town meetings of New England. Id. at 43.
169. Id at 32.
170. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (discussing application of English cor-
poration law to New York towns).
171. Act of Mar. 7, 1788, ch. 64,.2 Laws of the State of New York (1785-88), at 748 (Weed
Parsons & Co. 1888).
172. Act of Nov. 30, 1785, ch. 22, 1785 Mass. Laws 339.
173. Act of Mar. 7, 1788, ch. 64, 2 Laws of the State of New York (1785-88), at 744, 747
(Weed Parsons & Co. 1888). The Act's only mention of corporations was in its charter inviola-
bility savings clause, which asserted
[t]hat none of the bounds or lines by this act assigned for the limits of any or either
of the said towns, shall be deemed to take away, abridge, destroy or affect, the right
or title of any person or persons, bodies politics or corporate, in any manner or by
any means whatsoever.
Id at 762. Nonetheless, modern commentaries refer to this act and those for which it served
as a model as statutes of incorporation. See, e.g., McGovern, Creation, Control and Supervision of
Cities and Villages by the State, 20 BROOKLYn L. REv. 158, 158-65 (1954) (discussing evolution of
municipal corporations in New York State).
174. Act of Mar. 7, 1788, ch. 64, 2 Laws of the State of New York (1785-88), at 748, 762-
63 (Weed Parsons & Co. 1888).
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The statute authorized "the freeholders and inhabitants" at their
town meetings "to make. . . such prudential rules, orders and reg-
ulations, as the majority of the freeholders and inhabitants . . .
judge necessary and convenient."' 175 In contrast to the broad pow-
ers traditionally given to borough corporations,176 however, the act
sharply limited town powers to the building of fences and other ac-
tions "for the better improving of their common lands" and "for
ascertaining and directing the use and management and the times
and manner of using their common lands."'
177
Subsequent statutes confirmed the New Yorkers' perception that
towns were not corporations. 178 Yet, although towns were not cor-
porations, many villages began to be "incorporated" by statute after
1800.179 Indeed, by 1815 incorporation of villages had become
standard practice.' 8 0
175. Id. at 766.
176. See I S. KYD, supra note 7, at 69 (discussing incidental powers tacitly annexed by
incorporated entity); W. SHEPHEARD, supra note 18, at 109-29 (discussing nature of corpora-
tion and inherent powers); 1702 TREATiSE, supra note 18, at 209 (discussing incidents of mu-
nicipal corporation).
177. Act of Mar. 7, 1788, ch. 64, 2 Laws of the State of New York (1785-88), at 748, 766
(Weed Parsons & Co. 1888).
178. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 8, 1796, ch. 52, 3 Laws of the State of New York (1789-96), at
705, 706 (Weed Parsons & Co. 1887) (authorizing election of trustees); see also supra notes
167-70 and accompanying text (discussing role of town officials as trustees). Typically, acts
creating towns around the turn of the 19th century were called acts "to appoint trustees and
hold certain lands therein mentioned and for other purposes." See, e.g., Act of Mar. 25, 1794,
ch. 36, 3 Laws of the State of New York (1789-96), at 510, 510-11 (Weed Parsons & Co. 1887)
(appointing trustees for villages of Waterford and Troy); Act of Apr. 5, 1790, ch. 49, 3 Laws of
the State of New York (1789-96), at 178 (Weed Parsons & Co. 1887) (appointing trustees for
Village of Lansingburgh); see also Act of Apr. 8, 1796, ch. 52, 3 Laws of the State of New York
(1789-96), at 705, 706 (Weed Parsons & Co. 1887) (empowering proprietors of County of
Suffolk to elect three trustees to manage lands). These early acts were very explicit about the
trustee relationship they established. The 1790 Act creating the Town of Lansingburgh pro-
vided that "the said trustees hereby appointed, and their successors, are hereby enabled to
take a grant or grants. . . in trust to and for the common use and benefit of the freeholders
and inhabitants aforesaid." Act of Apr. 5, 1790, ch. 49, 3 Laws of the State of New York
(1789-96), at 178 (Weed Parsons & Co. 1887).
179. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 27, 1799, ch. 52, 4 Laws of the State of New York (1797-1800), at
365 (Weed Parsons & Co. 1887) (incorporating Village of Poughkeepsie). The Poughkeepsie
statute demonstrates a trend towards villages that were incorporated. Although the statute
created a corporation, it was still entitled "An Act to vest certain Powers in the Freeholders
and Inhabitants of the Village of Poughkeepsie," a formulation that the legislature had tradi-
tionally used to create unincorporated villages holding lands in trust. Id.; see also Act of Mar.
28, 1805, ch. 58, 1805 N.Y. Laws 200 (incorporating Waterford: "An Act to amend an act,
entitled 'An Act vesting certain powers in the freeholders and inhabitants of the Village of
Waterford' ").
180. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 1, 1817, ch. 96, 1817 N.Y. Laws 84, 84 (incorporating Village of
Rochesterville). Unlike Massachusetts' "statutes of incorporation," Act of Feb. 9, 1785, ch.
83, 1785 Mass. Special Laws 83-84, the New York acts incorporating villages formally created
corporations. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 27, 1799, ch. 52, 4 Laws of the State of New York (1797-
1800), at 365, 366 (Weed Parsons & Co. 1887) ("And be it further enacted, that all the free-
holders residing within the aforesaid [village] limits be and they are hereby ordained, consti-
tuted and declared. . . one body politic and corporate .... ").
One explanation why villages were corporations whereas towns were not was that towns
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Although New York law referred to these village statutes as "stat-
utes of incorporation,"1 8 1 New York courts did not blur the distinc-
tion between "real" chartered corporations and villages
incorporated by statute. New York lawyers continued to recognize a
clear distinction between incorporation by statute and incorporation
by charter. As late as 1821, courts were carefully preserving the dis-
tinction between the two approaches. In reference to the cities of
New York, Albany, Hudson, and Schenectady, a circuit judge noted
that "it is well known that, technically speaking, no charters had
been granted incorporating Hudson, and Schenectady. Those cities
were incorporated by statute."182 Thus even after the legislature
began "incorporating" villages by statute, New York lawyers contin-
ued to distinguish between towns and villages, whether "incorpo-
rated" or not, and New York City, which was a charter corporation.
3. New York towns as corporations for a particular purpose
Historians have traditionally asserted that American towns were
considered "quasi corporations" in contrast to real borough corpo-
rations such as New York City.' 8 3 In fact, New York courts did not
accept the analysis that towns were a special type of "quasi corpora-
tion;" New York courts refused to accept the conclusion that towns
and villages were corporations at all.1 84 This refusal led them into a
direct confrontation with the preclusive claims of English corpora-
tion law, which provided that if towns were not corporations, they
were precluded from holding land and from suing and being sued as
a group.
During the colonial era, New York towns had the capacity to hold
land through their trustees. 185 In 1807 Circuit Judge (later Chan-
cellor) James Kent reaffirmed this traditional analysis in Jackson v.
Schoonmaker. 18 6 Jackson raised the question of whether the town
trustees of Rochester had held the capacity to grant lands in 1714,
three years before they formally became trustees. The lawyers argu-
could exercise certain traditional town powers pursuant to the 1788 statute. Because villages
received no authority from the 1788 act, they were dependent on corporation law to provide
them with the legal authority to act as a group.
181. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 21, 1817, ch. 96, 1817 N.Y. Laws 84, 84 (incorporating Village of
Rochesterville). The title of this statute, "An act to incorporate the Village of Rochesterville
." is typical of post-1815 statutes.
182. Furman v. Knapp, 19Johns. 248, 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821).
183. See H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 186-92.
184. See infra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing New York court's rejection of
town as corporation).
185. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
186. 2 Johns. 230, 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807).
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ing in favor of the validity of the trustees' grant argued that the
trustees were in effect a corporation:
A patent was produced, dated the 25th of June, 1703, to certain
persons therein named, as trustees for all the freeholders and in-
habitants of the town of Rochester. It was proved by the town clerk,
and by the records of the annual election of trustees, from the
date of the charter to that day; that the freeholders and inhabit-
ants of Rochester, had annually chosen three trustees, and used to
keep and use a common seal, and recorded all conveyances by the
trustees of the common lands, and that the town-records had been
always deemed conclusive evidence of the acts of the trustees. It
was proved by these records . . . who were the trustees in 1729;
and a deed from them, under their corporate seal. . . was read in
evidence.
18 7
Kent rejected out of" hand the inference that the Rochester trust-
ees were a corporation. His explanation reflected New York law's
traditional solution of allowing towns to hold land through their
trustees without analyzing the town as corporations. Accordingly,
Kent held that "[tihere is no colour for the suggestion that the free-
holders and inhabitants of Rochester were incorporated as a body poli-
tic, by the patent of 1703. . . . The patent is in the usual form of a
grant [to the three trustees] as joint tenants."'
8 8
A series of cases decided in 1811 and 1812 called this traditional
solution into question. The first, Jackson v. Cory,' 89 determined
whether the county supervisors of Otsego County could sell the
county courthouse pursuant to a state statute. 90 The challenge to
the sale was that the county, not being a corporation, had no author-
ity to own land.' 9 ' "It will hardly be pretended that the counties are
corporations," argued the plaintiff's attorney, citing Kyd, "and not
being incorporated, they could not take as a corporation."'
' 92
The statement that counties were not corporations had a firm ba-
sis in English precedent. Most counties had never had charters and
were not considered corporations under English law. 193 But the
plaintiff's correct use of English precedent ended there. English
187. Id at 231-32.
188. Id at 233.
189. 8 Johns. 385 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811); see R. SF.voy, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
BUSINESS CORPORATION 21-23 (1982) (discussing Jackson v. Coy).
190. Jackson v. Cory, 8 Johns. 385, 387 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). In 1791 a land speculator
had donated a lot in Cooperstown to the people of the County of Otsego as a site for a
courthouse and jail. Id at 386. The county supervisors erected the buildings, and, in 1806,
an act of the state legislature authorized the supervisors to sell the land and buildings. Id.
191. Id.; see also R. S.Avoy, supra note 189, at 22.
192. Jackson v. Cory, 8 Johns. 385, 386 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
193. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing historical developments that
precluded counties from corporate status).
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courts had required incorporation for an unincorporated body such
as a county to exercise corporate powers only in the absence of a
specific enabling statute; lack of incorporation had never precluded
a county from holding land pursuant to specific statutory authoriza-
tion to do so.1
94
The New York court, howevei, accepted the plaintiff's argument
and asserted that "[i]t is the settled rule of the common law, that a
community, not incorporated, cannot purchase and take in succes-
sion."195 The court discounted the importance of the statute, stat-
ing that "[i]t is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to
authorize the supervisors to convey any thing more than the right
and title which they might have had in the lot."'u 9 The court made
no secret of the classic Federalist motivation behind its innovative
decision not only to deprive counties of important powers but seem-
ingly to deprive the legislature of the power to grant counties such
powers in the future. 197 The court stated that, "[t]o take away pri-
vate property by public authority, even for public uses, without mak-
ing a just compensation, is against the fundamental principles of
free government."'
98
In the same month, the New York Supreme Court decided an-
other case involving county authority to grant land,Jackson v. Hart-
well. 199 This time the supervisors of Oneida County held the land
involved in trust for the Town of Rome. 200 The supervisors were to
use the land in part for a jail and courthouse and in part for a
schoolhouse and church.20 1 The court once again considered the
central issue the corporate status of the county. But whereas the
court inJackson v. Cory held that the 1806 statute authorizing Otsego
to sell the courthouse failed to give the county the authority it
sought, the court in Jackson v. Hartwell accepted the proposition that
a state statute could authorize a community to act as a group even if
the group was not a corporation.20
2
In Hartwell the court looked to the 1788 statute that established
194. See, e.g., Statute of Westminster, 3 Ed. I c. 9 (1628) (cited in Russell v. Men of Devon,
2 T.R. 667, 668, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 360 (K.B. 1788), which provided that a hundred could
sue and be sued).
195. Jackson v. Cory, 8Johns. 385, 388 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
196. Id
197. For a discussion of the Federalist concern with protecting private property, see G.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 403-13, 503-06 (1969).
198. Jackson v. Cory, 8 Johns. 385, 385 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). The court also suggested
that allowing the county to sell the property would be unconstitutional. Id.
199. 8 Johns. 422 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). The same benefactor who granted the land in
Jackson v. Hartwell, granted the land in Jackson v. Cory. R. SEAVOY, supra note 189, at 22.
200. Jackson v. Hartwell, 8Johns. 422, 422 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
201. Id
202. Id at 426.
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the basic structure of counties and towns. It held that the statute
made Oneida County "a corporation for special purposes and with
special powers. ' 20 3 The court abandoned the strong presumption
ofJackson v. Cory that the legislature had not intended to give corpo-
rate powers to an unincorporated group. Instead, it adopted the
logic of those English courts that had held that if a community could
exercise a given corporate power, it was a corporation in that re-
gard.204 The New York court then did what English courts, in cases
like Russell v. Men of Devon, had not been willing to do and applied
the "corporation for a particular purpose" language outside the
traditional English context of churchwardens. 20 5
The court in Jackson v. Hartwell ultimately struck down the grant of
land in question: it held that the 1788 statute did not give counties
the capacity to hold land.20 6 The decision was influential despite its
holding because of its analysis of the county as a corporation for a
particular purpose. Courts soon applied this analysis to New York
towns, replacing the traditional view that New York towns were
trusts with legal authority to act through their trustees. The courts
did not fully accept this solution, however, for another six years.
20 7
Meanwhile, confusion reigned. Several months after the court's de-
cision in Jackson v. Hartwell, the New York Supreme Court held that
the Town of Rochester could not hold an interest in land because it
was not a corporation. 20 8 This holding appeared to confirm that
New York courts would no longer analyze towns as trusts; however,
their actual legal status remained unclear.
20 9
In 1817 Chancellor Kent attempted to dispel the confusion and
establish a clearcut basis for a town's capacity to hold real estate.
His opinion in Denton v. Jackson210 would be cited widely as support
203. Id at 425. The court actually said that the county was a corporation with "special
powers only." Id (emphasis added).
204. Id at 425; see supra notes 110-26 and accompanying text (discussing corporations for
a particular purpose at English common law).
205. Jackson v. Hartwell, 8Johns. 422,424-25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). The New York courts
also grouped into one doctrine references made by Kyd to disparate situations in which unin-
corporated entities could exercise certain corporate powers, because the groups were "like
corporations" in specific ways or "for special purposes." See id (citing I S. KYD, supra note 7,
at 9, 10, 12, 29, 31). The New York courts transformed scattered references into a formal
doctrine that these groups were all "corporations for special purposes."
206. Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Johns. 422, 424-25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
207. See infra notes 210-18 and accompanying text (discussing Denton v. Jackson).
208. Hornbeck v. Westbrook, 9 Johns. 73, 75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812). The issue involved
was actually whether Rochester had had the capacity to hold interests in land when it acquired
the property in 1730. It at 74-75.
209. See id' at 75 (citingJackson v. Schoonmaker, 2 Johns. 230 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807)) (hold-
ing that town could not take grant of land but citizens might gain some personal privilege
from grant).
210. 2 Johns. Ch. 320 (N.Y. Ch. 1817).
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for the theory that towns and other local units could be corporations
for particular purposes. Denton v. Jackson was a town partition case
of a type extremely common in New England.2 11 When North
Hempstead split off from the original Town of Hempstead, the in-
habitants of the original town claimed rights as tenants in common
to Hempstead's common lands. The new town of North Hempstead
claimed exclusive title to a portion of the lands, arguing that the
property that Hempstead originally owned had been conveyed to
North Hempstead pursuant to the town partition.
212
Chancellor Kent held for North Hempstead and offered two dif-
ferent rationales. First, Kent citedJackson v. Hartwell to support his
decision that Hempstead was a corporation for a particular purpose
and, as such, was given the capacity to hold land.213 Kent referred
to towns as "persons [who] may have corporate powers, sub modo,
and, for certain specified purposes only."
'214
This part of Kent's analysis was merely an extension of the doc-
trine elaborated in Jackson v. Hartwell. Kent, however, intertwined it
with a very different approach by asserting that towns were actually
corporations:
The grant was to the association and their successors, as well as
heirs, for public purposes of a municipal nature. The professed
objects of the grant were consistent with the design of bodies poli-
tic. There is no particular form of words requisite to create a cor-
poration. A grant of a rent to a chaplain and his successors, and a
grant to a body of men to hold mercantile meetings, (Gildam mer-
catoriam), has been held to confer a corporate capacity ...
There are many instances of grants to the inhabitants of a town,
that they should be a free borough, and enjoy various privileges
which have been considered as making them a corporate body.
2 15
211. For a discussion of town partition cases, see infra notes 310-11 and accompanying
text. Town partition cases appear not to have been very common in New York, even though
the New York legislature often divided one town into two or more new towns. See, e.g., Act of
Apr. 10, 1805, ch. 128, 1805 N.Y. Laws 586; Act of Apr. 17, 1815, ch. 210, 1815 N.Y. Laws
210; Act of Mar. 21, 1817, ch. 45, 1817 N.Y. Laws 84. North and South Hempstead were
created in 1788. Act of Mar. 7, 1788, ch. 64, 2 Laws of the State of New York (1785-88), at
748-49 (Weed Parsons & Co. 1888).
212. Denton v.Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 320, 322 (N.Y. Ch. 1817).
213. Id. at 325. Kent stated:
Several towns in this state may be considered as legal communities, or bodies politic,
for certain purposes. They are authorized, at their town meetings, to make rules and
regulations for the better improving of "their common lands in tillage, pasturage, or
any other reasonable way," and for making and maintaining pounds, and for impos-
ing penalties, and to raise money for prosecuting or defending the common rights of
the town; and all such rules or by-laws are to be recorded by the town clerk.
Id.
214. Idl
215. Id. at 324-25.
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This language suggests that the court should construe the grant cre-
ating Hempstead as creating a corporation. Yet most of the lan-
guage in Kent's opinion indicated that he did not mean to alter the
"corporation for a particular purpose" analysis by implying that
towns were actually corporations. Even if he did, subsequent New
York courts rejected that innovation, which courts in New England
had already accepted. 2 16 The New York courts adhered to the un-
derstanding that towns were "endowed with a corporate capacity in
some particulars expressed, but [they] have, in no other respect, the
capacities incident to a corporation.
' 217
A series of cases decided between 1820 and 1826 involving the
issue of whether towns had the power to sue and be sued further
developed the proposition that towns were like corporations in cer-
tain respects, but were not actually corporations. The courts framed
the issue as whether town officers were "quasi corporations.''218
In 1820 Rouse v. Moore219 first raised the question in New York of
whether town officers could sue or be sued. Specifically, the case
presented the issue of which of two towns was responsible for the
upkeep of a pauper.220 The plaintiff's lawyer defined the issue as
whether the officers were "quasi corporations."' 22 ' It will be recal-
led that in England, the court in Men of Devon used the term in
describing an attorney's argument that unincorporated local units
should be given corporate powers because they were "quasi corpo-
rations. '222 Although the English court had rejected the argu-
ment, 223 the plaintiff's lawyer in Rouse reasserted it and cited Kyd for
support. 224 Unlike lawyers in Massachusetts, who used the term
216. See supra notes 321-74 and accompanying text (discussing treatment in New England
of towns as "quasi corporations" in the early 19th century).
217. Jackson v. Hartwell, 8Johns. 422,425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). The court repeated this
statement virtually verbatim in 1820. Rouse v. Moore, 18 Johns. 407, 418 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1820) (citing Jackson v. Hartwell).
218. The "quasi corporation" language no doubt occurred to the courts because Russell v.
Men of Devon had used the language in a case involving an unincorporated county's liability to
suit. Compare infra notes 313-18 and accompanying text (discussing adoption in Massachusetts
of municipal corporation language) with infra notes 219-49 and accompanying text (discussing
New York's difficulty with corporation language). But, although New York courts used quasi
corporation language, they did not use the doctrine as Massachusetts courts did, to define
what kind of corporation towns were. Instead, New York courts used the term to explain why
towns could sue and be sued as a group even though they were not corporations. The New
York courts' correct citation of Men of Devon, see infra notes 227-28 and accompanying text,
was but one aspect of their greater respect for correct use of English corporation law.
219. 18 Johns. 407 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820).
220. Rouse v. Moore, 18Johns. 407, 407 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820). For a discussion of Massa-
chusetts pauper cases, see infra note 311 and accompanying text.
221. Rouse v. Moore, 18Johns. 407, 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820).
222. Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667,671-72, 100 Eng. Rep. 359,361-62 (K.B. 1788).
223. See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text (discussing Men of Devon).
224. Rouse v. Moore, 18 Johns. 407, 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820).
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"quasi corporation" to hold that towns were in fact corporations, 2 25
the plaintiff's lawyer in Rouse used the term to explain why the over-
seers had the specific corporate powers despite the fact that they
were not corporations: "Though not strictly a corporation, having a
corporate name and seal; yet they are quasi corporations, having a
succession, and a capacity to sue and be sued, as to all matters ap-
pertaining to their official duties." 226 Moreover, the question posed
was whether the overseers, rather than the town itself, were "quasi
corporations." 227
Neither the opposing counsel nor the court adopted the novel
"quasi corporation" terminology. The opposing counsel used
Chancellor Kent's term for a corporation for a particular purpose,
"a corporation sub modo." 22 8 The court compared the town officers
to churchwardens, the classic English example of a corporation for a
particular purpose, and held that the overseers did have the corpo-
rate capacity to sue and be sued.
Three years later, in 1823, the New York Supreme Court in Todd
v. Birdsa1229 affirmed the Rouse holding.230 Three aspects of the
court's opinion are notable. First, like the court in Rouse, the court
in Birdsall did not adopt the quasi corporation language which the
counsel again suggested.231 Second, the court made very clear that
it was in effect holding that the overseers-not the town itself-were
a corporation for one particular purpose, to sue and be sued.23 2 Fi-
nally, the court made it clear that it viewed its earlier holding that
unincorporated towns could exercise a corporate power as novel
and of limited scope.233 The court signaled that it had based its
holding on practical considerations and had not meant to suggest
that local officials had a broad range of corporate powers by
implication:
225. See infta notes 321-25, 344-15 & 370-71 and accompanying text (discussing the quasi
corporation argument in Massachusetts).
226. Rouse v. Moore, 18Johns. 407, 411 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820).
227. See id. Thus, the issue was not whether the town was a corporation aggregate, but
whether the overseers were sole corporations. The quasi corporation argument may have
been a translation into corporate language of another court's holding that town officers could
sue and be sued as agents of the town. See Olney v. Wickes, 18Johns. 122, 125-26 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1820).
228. Rouse v. Moore, 18Johns. 407, 413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820). For a discussion of corpo-
rations sub modo, see supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
229. 1 Cow. 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823).
230. Id at 260.
231. Id The attorney for Todd not only used the term "quasi corporations" but cited to
Men of Devon and to Rumford v. Wood, 14 Mass. 193 (1816), an important Massachusetts case
involving the quasi corporation argument. I Cow. at 262. For a discussion of Runford v.
Wood, see infra notes 330-45 and accompanying text.
232. Todd v. Birdsall, 1 Cow. 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823).
233. Id. at 260-61.
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Overseers of the Poor are not a corporation, according to the
technical meaning of the term. . . In Johnson v. Hartwell. . . this
Court held, that the Supervisors of a county were a corporation
for special purposes, and with special powers only. . . who have,
in no other respect, the capacities incident to a corporation ....
It seems highly expedient, that legal liabilities, incurred by their
predecessors in office [of the current Supervisors], for the support
of the poor, ought, upon a sound construction of their duties and
powers, to devolve upon them. It is incident to their office, which,
in this respect, may be viewed in the nature of a corporation
234
Traditional New York courts were wary of expanding their hold-
ings that gave towns the power to hold land and to sue and be sued
into a general rule that towns could exercise all the powers of corpo-
rations. Nonetheless, this principle was finally advanced in 1823 in
Janson v. Ostrander,23 5 a case questioning whether a town supervisor
could sue and be sued.2 3 6 Justice Woodworth, who wrote for the
majority, took New York's typically conservative approach.
Although he held that the supervisors, not the town itself, could sue
and be sued, Woodworth not only stated that town supervisors did
not exercise full corporate powers; he also asserted that the town
officers' capacity to sue and be sued differed from the equivalent
capacity of an actual corporation. 23 7 In a concurring opinion,
238
Chief Justice Savage took a less conservative approach. He sug-
gested that towns could exercise full corporate rights because they
were quasi corporations, and that town officers had all the powers
that officers traditionally held or had need of to enable them to per-
form their duties.23 9 Savage stated that
[f]rom an examination of the act relative to towns, it would be
seen that there are a variety of persons, in each of the towns, .
clothed with corporate powers and capacities, so far as is neces-
sary to the execution of the trust confined to them. . . . It would
seem, therefore, that the Supervisor possesses certain corporate
234. Id
235. 1 Cow. 670 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823).
236. Id at 677. This was a separate issue from whether overseers of the poor were sole
corporations with the power to sue and be sued.
237. Id at 681.
238. IL at 683 (Savage, C.J., concurring).
239. Id Savage also suggested that the officers were, in fact, corporations "by custom."
Id This is a much more anachronistic argument than Massachusetts lawyers ever would have
used at this time. Massachusetts lawyers instead tended to argue that towns were aggregate
corporations of a kind different from common-law corporations. See infra notes 351-52 and
accompanying text (discussing novel argument by Massachusetts lawyer against powers by
custom). Justice Savage's argument was similar to the Massachusetts courts' use of the quasi
corporation argument. See infra notes 339-52 and accompanying text (discussing quasi corpo-
rations in Massachusetts law).
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powers and capacities, at least so far as to enable him to perform
his official duties .... 240
The majority of the court rejected Savage's analysis. 24 1 In 1826,
however, when another set of parties litigated for yet a third time
the issue of whether overseers of the poor could sue and be sued,
242
the majority cited Rouse but broadened its holding considerably to
conform with language in ChiefJustice Savage's concurring opinion
in Ostrander. The majority stated that "the town officers are consid-
ered as quasi corporations, so far as is necessary for each to perform
their several trusts imposed upon them by their several offices."
'243
Moreover, the court at last abandoned the notion that the town of-
ficers, rather than the towns themselves, were corporations for par-
ticular purposes. The court explained that in these cases, "strictly
speaking, it is not the officers of the town, but the town itself, which
is the corporation. " 2
44
Thus, in considering whether towns could sue and be sued, by
1826 New York courts had begun tentatively to suggest that towns
were corporations. But the issue was by no means clearly settled.
In 1828 the legislature attempted to resolve the matter by passing
an act that proclaimed towns and counties to be "bodies corporate,"
with the power to sue and be sued, to purchase and hold lands, to
contract, and "to make such orders for the disposition, regulation or
use of its corporate property, as may be deemed conducive to the
interests of its inhabitants." 245 Despite this statute, New York
courts continued to dispute whether towns were corporations for
another thirty years. Shortly after passage of the statute, in a second
case involving a dispute between Hempstead and North Hempstead,
North Hempstead's attorneys asserted that Hempstead had never
owned the commons because "towns are not corporations." 246 The
court's opinion demonstrated its confusion. Although ChiefJustice
Savage stated that "I consider the town of Hempstead a corporation";
his opinion did not actually hold that towns were corporations.
247
The sense in which New York towns were corporations remained
240. Jansen v. Ostrander, I Cow. 670, 684 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1823) (Savage, CJ.,
concurring).
241. Id at 681.
242. Grant v. Fancher, 5 Cow. 309 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1826). Unlike previous cases in which
litigants questioned the overseer's liability to suit, Grant brought to issue the overseers' ability
to sue a corporation. IL
243. Id at 311. The court asserted that the overseers must have a capacity to sue com-
mensurate with their public trust to discharge the duties of their office. Id. at 312.
244. d
245. 9 N.Y. REv. STAT. ch. XI, tit. 1, § 1 (1828) (towns); id ch. XII, tit. 1, § 1 (counties).
246. Hempstead v. North Hempstead, 2 Wend. 109, 116-17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).
247. Id at 135 (emphasis added).
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unclear, and New York lawyers seemed at a loss for a solution. They
could not hold that New York's towns and villages were corpora-
tions without reinterpreting the status of New York City. The two
prerequisites that eventually motivated such a reinterpretation did
not yet exist by 1830.
To reinterpret New York City's borough status, New York courts
had first to be willing to face an enormous political battle with the
city and its supporters. The time was not yet ripe for such a battle in
1830; not until 1850 were the political conditions suitable for such a
struggle.248 The second prerequisite was the subtle and gradual
shift in New Yorkers' mentality that made the identification of the
city as a "corporation" seem less and less convincing.249 Hartog has
linked this shift to changes in what he terms the "governmental cul-
ture" of the city.250 Not until long after New York City had ceased
to function as a traditional corporation did lawyers and judges aban-
don the old rubric and invent new doctrines better suited to the in-
stitution that nineteenth century New York City had become.
Either the courts or the legislature had to reinterpret New York
City's legal status before they could resolve the legal status of New
York towns and villages. New York City's status, however, would
not be reinterpreted until its governmental culture changed. For
these reasons New York courts moved slowly in their efforts to
adapt English corporation law to American circumstances. Massa-
chusetts courts faced no such political or conceptual problems in
their efforts to define a new legal status for New England towns. In
fact, as the following section shows, the governmental culture of
New England actually made it easier for Massachusetts courts to
abandon English corporation law.
B. English Corporation Law in Massachusetts: The Invention of the
Municipal Corporation
In Massachusetts the New England town heavily influenced the
outlook ofjudges and played a central role in the political self-image
of New England. The traditional prestige of the New England town
248. ChiefJustice Nelson was ready to do battle by 1835. In People v. Morris, 13 Wend.
325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835), the court accepted his dichotomy between private and public corpo-
rations, a dichotomy that lumped together all towns and cities, including New York City, as
potentially vulnerable to state intervention. Caution, however, gained the upper hand. See
Purdy v. People, 4 Hill 384, 395 (N.Y. 1842) (reversing People v. Morris). The battle against
New York City did not come to a head until after 1850. See H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 209-39
(discussing rise of public/private distinction and its effect on New York City).
249. See generally H. HARTOG, supra note 8 (detailing gradual movement from borough to
municipality and consequent reassessment of New York City's status).
250. Idt at 129-57.
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caused judges to take for granted that towns had legitimate status
and substantial powers. These convictions made English corpora-
tion law's preclusive claims seem absurd. In the eyes of Massachu-
setts judges, the claim that only an historically defined set of
boroughs could exercise governmental powers was viewed as a re-
flection of the law's inadequacy, rather than a valid conclusion about
the powers of Massachusetts towns. Moreover, the towns them-
selves were adamant in their rejection of borough status. Massachu-
setts judges responded by rejecting English corporation law in the
early nineteenth century. As early as 1816, Massachusetts courts
held that Massachusetts towns were not boroughs but instead were
"municipal" corporations.
This section analyzes how Massachusetts courts reached this con-
clusion, which clearly contradicted English law, within a short pe-
riod of time and within a legal system based on precedent. The
following two sections examine how the governmental culture of
New England enabled Massachusetts courts to adopt the theoretical
definition of incorporation as the legal concept that enabled a group
to act in concert. The final two sections discuss the cases in which
Massachusetts courts concluded that towns were municipal
corporations.
1. The New England town
"We already know, as Edmund Morgan long ago remarked, more
than any sane man would want to know about colonial New Eng-
land." 25 ' The New England town has received particular attention.
Current issues of debate include the relative power of, and the rela-
tionship between, the central colonial government and New Eng-
land towns, and the extent to which New England settlers imported
English local law and custom to the New World. For the purposes
of this Article, a few basic characteristics of Massachusetts towns
need to be noted.
First, New England towns clearly were an institution of central
political importance in a way that New York towns never were. His-
torians disagree on when towns played a predominant role in New
England, 252 not on whether towns ever functioned as a major political
251. Zuckerman, Reply to D. Allen, The Zuckerman Thesis and the Process of Legal Rationalization
in Provincial Massachusetts, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 461, 466 (1972).
252. Historians' traditional interpretation was that power in Massachusetts grew increas-
ingly centralized during most of the provincial period. See Allen, The Zuckerman Thesis and the
Process of Legal Rationalization in Provincial Massachusetts, 29 WM. & MARY Q 443, 443 (1972)
(reexamining Zuckerman's thesis and suggesting that centralization of power in Massachu-
setts applied only to some towns for part of provincial period); Murrin, Review Essay, 11 HIsT.
& THEORY 226 (1972) (reviewing five books that investigate development of early New Eng-
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institution. 253
Second, it is important to note that the issue of the legal status of
Massachusetts towns is quite independent of the question on which
recent New England historians have focused most of their attention,
namely whether there was a shift in actual authority from the town to
the central colonial government or the reverse in the eighteenth
century. 25 4 The formal legal relationship of New England towns to
central authority became established in the early seventeenth cen-
tury and did not change substantially thereafter.
At first, settlements in New England had no legal status, little gov-
ernmental authority, and they were called "plantations. ' 255 Gradu-
ally, the town meeting became a central political institution common
to most New England towns. 256 The town meeting "paralleled to a
very large degree" the vestry meetings of English parishes. 257 By the
land towns). Michael Zuckerman challenged this view in his book Peaceable Kingdoms, pub-
lished in 1970. Professor Zuckerman's thesis was that the central government at Boston
exercised very substantial secular and ecclesiastical powers over Massachusetts towns in the
17th century, but that, after 169 1, power shifted "from hierarchical 'coercive' to local 'accom-
modative' consensus." M. ZucKERmAN, PEcFABLF KINGDOMS 444-45 (1970). In the 18th cen-
tury, according to Zuckerman, towns were virtually autonomous from the central government.
Id. at 51. For a different approach that also focuses on the central importance of towns, see
Breen, Persistent Localism, 32 WM. & MARY Q. 3 (1975) (asserting relationship between preim-
migration institutional experience of colonists and their determination to maintain local au-
thority); Breen, Transfer of Culture: Chance and Design in Shaping Massachusetts Bay, 132 NEw ENG.
HisT. & GENEOLOGICAL REG. 3 (1978) (comparing foundations of 17th century localism in
New England to preimmigration practices in England).
Zuckerman's view has been controversial since he first articulated it. See, e.g., Murrin, supra,
at 245-76 (questioning Zuckerman's thesis); Wroth, Possible Kingdoms: The New England Town
From the Perspective of Legal History, 15 AM.J. LEG. His. 318, 318-19 (posing three counterpro-
positions that would significantly modify Zuckerman's thesis); see also Konig, English Legal
Change and the Origins of Local Government in Northern Massachusetts, in TowN AND CouNTRY 12-43
(B. Daniels ed. 1978) (citing examples to suggest that towns had little power in relation to
county courts). David Grayson Allen has forwarded a recent challenge. D.G. ALLEN, IN ENG-
LISH WAYS (1981). To simplify Professor Allen's position, he generally agrees with the tradi-
tional analysis, but gives even greater stress to the local autonomy in the 17th century, which
he believes was followed by a precipitous shift of authority to the provincial government in
the eighteenth century. Allen ties this movement to the waning influence of English custom
and law. But see Reid, Book Review, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 850, 850-66 (local autonomy explicable
by lack of central authority), 865-66 (Allen fails to account for precipitousness of decrease in
influence). Compare Zuckerman, supra note 251, 461-68 (claiming "Allen samples my thesis
with unbecoming ineptitude") with Murrin, supra, at 245 (calling Peaceable Kingdoms "a sharply
disappointing book which adds little to what [Zuckerman] has already said").
253. But see Konig, in TowN AND CouNTRY, supra note 252, at 26-28 (suggesting that towns
had little power compared to county magistrates). See infra note 260 (critiquing Konig's
thesis).
254. See supra note 252 (setting out positions in the debate).
255. Konig, in TowN AND CouN-ry, supra note 252, at 28.
256. The exact role of the town meeting in the town's power configurations is the subject
of much discussion among historians. See Lockridge & Krieder, The Evolution of Massachusetts
Town Government, 1640 to 1740, 23 WM. & MARY 0. 549, 549-74 (1966) (warning against over-
concentration on the "continuity of external forms"). Those forms, however, are of major
importance to this Article and to legal history. See also K. LOCKRMDGE, A NEW ENGLAND TowN
(1970) (studying inception and growth of single community to gain sense of local life).
257. Lockridge & Krieder, supra note 256, at 550.
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seventeenth century, the legal authority of vestry meetings to pass
by-laws began to be challenged. 258 The New England town meet-
ings faced the same uncertainty with respect to their legal authority
to act. The wariness in Massachusetts of rights based on custom
compounded the problem.
Massachusetts responded to this uncertainty by giving town pow-
ers a statutory basis. The colonial government of Massachusetts
passed the first "Town Act" in 1636.259 This act and later acts were
far broader than any of the specific parliamentary grants to English
parishes. 260 To quote from a later Town Act adopted in 1647, towns
were given the "power to make such laws and Constitutions as may
concern the welfare of their Town. Provided they be not of a crimi-
nal but only of a prudential nature. and not repugnant to the
publick Laws."
26'
These statutes were essentially an amplification of the English
doctrine that towns could act "pro bono publico." 262 The authority
of English towns to pass by-laws pursuant to their power to act pro
bono publico appears to have extended only to the repair of bridges
and highways. 263 The Massachusetts Town Acts, however, granted
much broader powers:
Beginning "whereas particular towns have many things which
concern only themselves," the General Court provided that the
town (or, its resident freemen acting collectively) should have the
power to dispose of its own lands, make bylaws not repugnant to
the laws established by the General Court, and "to choose their
own particular officers [such] as constables, surveyors for the
highways and the like." Hereafter it was clear who constituted the
town meeting and what was its competence. And it was a very
broad competence as it then stood, with its bylaws ". . . not re-
258. See I B. & S. WEBB, supra note 94, at 39; see supra notes 107-26 (discussing use and
difficulties of vestry meeting power in England).
259. See Konig, in TowN AND COUNTRY, supra note 252, at 29.
260. Cf. id at 29-30. Konig argues that the Town Acts "constituted town governments [in
Massachusetts] closely to resemble the weak and limited structure of English parochial or
manorial administration." Id. at 29. His argument appears to be based on a misunderstand-
ing of parish powers in England. Konig misquotes the Webbs to support his claim that Eng-
lish parishes had sharply constricted powers. Id. at 19-20 (quoting I B. & S. WEBB, supra note
94, at 40). Konig quotes the Webbs as claiming that the parish "was regarded by no one as an
organ of autonomous self-government." Konig, in TOWN AND CoUNTRY, supra note 252, at 19.
The Webbs' position, however, was that the parish exercised substantial powers despite the fact
that "any member of the governing class" in England would have viewed the county as the
primary organ of local government. I B. & S. WEBB, supra note 94, at 279-80; supra notes 103-
07 and accompanying text (discussing relationship between parish and county).
261. 1647 Mass. Town Act, THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSL-rs 50 (1648 & re-
print 1929).
262. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (discussing authority of English par-
ishes to act pro bono publico).
263. Id
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pugnant" and "own particular officers . . . and the like." Such
clauses were broad, open-ended mandates for the town meeting
to manage local business.
264
The unique history of the New England town had a major influ-
ence on Massachusetts decisions defining town powers. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in some sense invented
the municipal corporation as a name for the difference between
Massachusetts towns and borough corporations. Moreover, the
court, in its first attempt to articulate the power of its towns, found it
easy to accept the notion that towns derived their powers from
statutes.
2. Incorporation in New England
"One important question remains," says Ernest Griffith in his
study of incorporation of colonial cities, "why was the desire for
borough incorporation so conspicuously lacking in the inhabitants
of the New England colonies?" 265 Attitudes towards "incorpora-
tion" in New England highlight the manner in which tensions in
English corporation law, which in England remained as ambiguities,
were resolved in Massachusetts.
The reason why New England towns were not corporate boroughs
is very clear: New Englanders did not want them to be.266 New Eng-
land settlers vigorously opposed incorporation of Boston through-
out the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. A 1714
pamphlet argued that incorporation would give rise to great ex-
pense because citizens would be taxed to support the traditional
pomp, circumstance, and officers of English boroughs. It would
make necessary "a Town, Prison and Keeper, a Bridewell, and
keeper of Two Great Silver Maces, to be carried before the Mayor,
and Two Men to carry them; and a Sword Bearer, a Clerk of the
Court; a Clerk of the Market; a Recorder; a Chamberlain .. *"267
Furthermore, incorporation would have required Boston to aban-
don its free trade policies and to adopt borough monopolies that
would have required merchants to sell all goods in the city market
and subject the merchants to the "dues and duties" of the corpora-
tion.268 The 1714 pamphlet argued, "[t]hat which is worst [sic] than
264. Lockridge & Krieder, supra note 256, at 550-51.
265. See 1 E. GRIFFrrH, HIsTORY OF AMERICAN CrIY GOVERNMENT 71 (1938) (noting con-
spicuous lack of incorporation of New England towns).
266. See J. TEAFORD, supra note 11, at 35-44 (New Englanders sought greater economic
freedom and greater local autonomy than European boroughs allowed).
267. Ford, Communication of Two Documents Protesting against the Incorporation of Boston, in 10
PUBLICATIONS OF THE COLONIAL SOC'Y OF MAss. 345, 345-56 (1906).
268. IA at 346.
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all, is to the Trading part [of Boston inhabitants] which is put under
a possibility of being reduced to manage but one Trade, which will
be great Confusion, if not Unsupportable in its difficulties, viz. The
Shop-keepers which do many of them occupy more than Twelve
Trades .... *269 The final economic result of incorporation,
warned another pamphleteer, would be to "driv[e] out the Trade of
the Town, to its Neighbouring Towns, & so make them Rich and
Happy, and this Poor, and Miserable."
270
The pamphleteers also inveighed against the oligarchical nature
of borough corporations, in which a special group of citizens con-
trolled the city. Incorporation, Bostonians feared, would take away
"the Ancient rights, and undoubted Property of our Voting at Town
Meetings, which we now enjoy." 271 One pamphleteer added that
I do not like the Rule of Regulating of [the proposed corpora-
tion], nor the Qualifications of Mayor & Alderman; for a Man may
be worth 1000 pounds and yet have neither Grave nor good Man-
ners, but be a Covetous Man, that may be like a Wolfe among
Sheep; an honest man may not come into the Town without buy-
ing his Freedom .... 272
There was no doubt in the pamphleteers' minds that their form of
government differed fundamentally from that of borough
corporations:
Boston has now been Settled for near an Hundred years, and has
from its Infant State, till now, been Governed by the same Meth-
ods it is at this day. Our Forefathers, the first Founders of this
Town, esteemed by all that ever heard of them, to be Judicious,
Understanding Men; chose and preferred this sort of Town Gov-
ernment, under which we now live, & under which they lived all
their time, to all others whatsoever: And many of them lived to see
this spot of Ground, from a Wilderness and Desert place, as it
was, to become in their day, a town Considerable for Trade,
Riches and Number of Inhabitants; thro' the Good Government
of it; And their Descendants and those who have come after them
may indeed, justly, now behold it as the most considerable Town;
for the time it has stood, on the whole Earth. What an Instance
then of Folly and Levity in a People must it needs appear, to all
considering Persons, for them to Change a Government under
which they have thus prospered, for One which may be their utter
ruin, Confusion & Undoing .... 273
269. Id
270. Id at 349.
271. Id at 346.
272. Id at 347; see also id& at 351-52 (suggesting that actual charter might be less liberal
than advertised charter).
273. Id at 349.
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The pamphlets also show how early New England residents recog-
nized that the role of borough corporations in England-as sacred
protectors of English basic rights against Stuart encroachment-was
irrelevant in the New World. They argued that Boston already en-
joyed the powers the incorporation afforded to English boroughs:
But they who are for a Corporation, may make the following Ob-
jection, to what has been said, Viz. If the being Incorporated brings
Charges and Troubles only on a People, without Privileges and Advantages,
how come it to pass, that almost every Town in Great Britain has sought to
be, and is a Corporation? The Answers to this Objection...
1. Then the Inhabitants of a Town in Great Britain, before they
are Incorporated, have no Power at all to make any Orders, or By-
Laws for their own Rule or Government, but are altogether De-
pendent on, and Governed by the General Laws of the Kingdom;
and therefore are under a sort of necessity to seek for a Charter,
and of being Incorporated, that so they may have a Power to make
By-laws or Orders referring to some particular Affairs among
themselves, which the General Laws of the Land don't take notice
of, or sufficiently provide for. But Boston has already the Power of
making By-Laws as we have here before shewn, and therefore
needs not a Charter on this Account. 2
74
These arguments evidently proved persuasive, for their propo-
nents defeated ten separate attempts to incorporate Boston.275 The
result:
There were thus some twenty-four municipal corporations of the
more pretentious type [i.e. borough corporations] created in the
American colonies. Nearly three-fourths of this number were lo-
cated . . . in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Except
[for] the short-lived Acomenticus or Gorgeana [in Maine], none
were to be found in New England.2 7
6
Although no borough corporations existed in New England, by the
eighteenth century New England towns were "incorporated." Eng-
lish corporation law explains this apparent contradiction.
English corporation law defined "corporations" in two separate
ways. 2 7 7 First, the term "corporation" described those "ancient
boroughs" that were part of a closed set of chartered towns, all of
274. Id at 350. The second major power incorporation gave in England that Boston al-
ready had was the power to hold its own courts. Id
275. Id. at 353-54. Attempts to incorporate Boston occurred in 1650, 1659, 1661, 1662,
1663, 1677, 1708-09, 1714, 1762, and 1784. Id.
276. 1 J.S. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HIsToRY OF CORPORATIONs 59-60 (1917).
277. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (discussing historical and theoretical
definitions of corporations in England).
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which had or pretended to have medieval origins.278 Second, the
concept of incorporation provided the sole theoretical framework
available in English law that allowed groups to act in concert.279 In
England and New York, the existence of an historically defined set
of "corporations" precluded lawyers and courts from taking advan-
tage of the theoretical definition of "incorporation." Lawyers in
New England did not feel similarly constrained. Consequently, they
developed a new definition of "incorporation" that exploited Eng-
lish corporation law's theoretical potential.
In the early eighteenth century, the term "corporation" was still
used in New England as it was used in England. New England towns
were viewed as corporations only in the sense that a group with lim-
ited corporate characteristics was sometimes referred to as a "cor-
poration for particular purposes." 280 Governor Hutchinson of
Massachusetts, for example, noted that "[n]ot only the town of Bos-
ton, but every town in the old colony, were to many purposes a corpo-
rate body. ' 281 In 1717 the trustees of Yale College referred to
towns, saying that "[t]hese are not bodies corporate yet as ye com-
mon law allows one as it were incorporate to do some things
.... "282 Implicit in both these statements is a recognition of the
difference between these "incorporated" towns and true common-
law corporations. 2
8 3
The question of whether New England towns were true corpora-
tions was never a pressing one. 28 4 The 1694 Act "enable[d] Towns,
Villages and Proprietors in Common and Undivided lands, etc. to
sue and be sued."' 28 5 A separate statute gave towns authority to
hold land 28 6 and the first Town Act gave them broad powers to pass
by-laws. 28 7
In the course of the eighteenth century, a shift took place in the
278. See supra notes 80 & 86-87 and accompanying text (sketching how corporations in
England were limited to an historically defined closed set).
279. See supra notes 81-84 (discussing scholastic attempts to define corporations
theoretically).
280. See supra notes 111-26 and accompanying text (discussing English use of "corpora-
tion for a particular purpose").
281. SeeJ.S. DAvis, supra note 276, at 63 (quoting T. HuTCHINSON, HISTORY OF MASSACHV-
sE'rs i, 175n (London 1765) (emphasis added by Davis)).
282. Id at 63 (emphasis added).
283. Id
284. B. DANIELS, THE CONNECTICuT TOWN 13 (1979). Daniels asserts that towns only wor-
ried about their legal status "[b]riefly, during the period of the Dominion of New England,
when colonial governments were being challenged by England... " Id. at n.13.
285. 1 Mass. Prov. Acts 182-83 (1694), quoted in J.S. DAvis, supra note 276, at 62. Davis
noted that such an act would have been unnecessary if the towns were full corporations. Id
286. MASS. BAY PROVINCE-CHARTERS, AcTS AND LAwS 1691-1743, ch. V, at 59-60 (1694).
287. See supra note 259 and accompanying text (discussing original town acts).
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use of the term "incorporation" in Massachusetts. Statutes began to
raise New England settlements that had begun life as plantations to
the status of "incorporated" townships with the accompanying priv-
ileges.2 8 Exactly when these statutes became known as "statutes of
incorporation" is unclear, but by 1785, a fairly typical statute used
the "incorporation" language explicitly: "An act for incorporating
the Plantation called Pearsontown into a town. .. ," 289 Unlike stat-
utes incorporating New York villages, however, these statutes did
not create formal corporations.2 90 Instead, the New England stat-
utes mobilized the theoretical definition of corporations from Eng-
lish corporation laws: "incorporation" simply meant the political act
that allowed a group of settlers to act as a town.
Statements from English treatises, once divorced from the Eng-
lish political context, offered ample support for this theoretical in-
terpretation of "incorporation." For example, the English
authorities from Shepheard on had held that incorporation required
"no set form of words. ' 29 1 Massachusetts adopted and applied this
principle with vigor.2
92
Thus, New York and New England used the words "corporation"
and "incorporate" very differently. The governmental culture of
New York ensured that New York courts would preserve the English
understanding of a corporation as a corporate borough. Courts in
Massachusetts, however, functioned in a society in which "incorpo-
ration" meant simply the legal act that allowed a group of settlers to
act as a town. This distinction proved crucial in the divergent devel-
opment of local government law in the two states.
3. Massachusetts towns as corporations
Despite the statutes purporting to "incorporate" Massachusetts
288. B. DANIELS, supra note 284, at 27.
289. Act of Nov. 30, 1785, ch. 22, 1785 Mass. Laws 339; see also J.S. DAvis, supra note 276,
at 62 (citing 1785 statute as first unmistakable grant of corporate powers to a town).
290. SeeJ.S. DAVIs, supra note 276, at 62-63. Davis suggests that Massachusetts towns re-
sembled quasi corporations more than actual corporations. Id. (citing Rumford v. Wood, 13
Mass. 193, 198 (1816)).
291. See, e.g., W. SHEPHEARD, supra note 18, at 13; 2J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAw *276; 1 S. KYD, supra note 7, at 62.
292. J.S. Davis notes the difficulty in establishing with any precision when towns became
corporations:
The line between the true corporations and those which are improperly so desig-
nated is exceedingly difficult to draw. Suffice it to say at the outset that the terms
"incorporate," "corporation," "body politic," and "charter" are used in this connec-
tion both by contemporaries and by later writers with the greatest looseness; and that
it is not always safe to infer that a town in connection with which such terms have
been used actually possessed the characteristics of a legal corporation.
J.S. DAvis, supra note 276, at 62-63.
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towns, the sense in which such towns were corporations remained
unclear at the turn of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, post-
Revolutionary Massachusetts courts did refer to towns as corpora-
tions primarily in the context of three major types of cases.
The first class of cases focused on whether a town's common
lands were owned by the town proprietors as tenants in common or
by the town as "corporate" property. The common lands of many
New England towns originally were conveyed to their settlers as ten-
ants in common. 293 When the legislature incorporated a town into a
separate political unit, its common lands became the "corporate
property" of the town. 294 This use of the term "corporate" re-
turned to the central notion that incorporation enabled incorpora-
tors to pass property to their corporate successors instead of to their
personal heirs. 295 The court in Proprietors of Monumoi Great Beach v.
Rogers296 applied this concept. The litigants questioned "whether
the acts of individuals claiming under the ancient proprietors .. .
can be given in evidence so as to support this action of trespass [by
defendant] upon the possession of the proprietors .... -297 The
proprietors could not prove they had acted as a corporation at any
time after 1756 because they had lost their corporate books.298
Three of the four judges voted to admit the oral evidence. 299 The
one dissenting judge stated briefly the English view that unincorpo-
rated individuals had to sue in their own names and not as a
group.3 00 The majority rejected the English rule. One judge stated
that
[t]his is a species of corporation different from corporations in
general-this is intended to die-those to live forever. I make these
observations to show that common law rules as to corporations in
general do not apply, in all instances, to this kind of corporation.
These statutes take away no rights from the individuals compos-
ing such a corporation, which, as tenants in common, they had
before they were incorporated-but on the contrary give them
293. See R. AKAGi, THE TowN PROPRIETORS OF THE NEW ENGLAND COLONIES 9, 30-38
(1924) (discussing grants "to groups of individuals").
294. This is how post-Revolutionary courts described the situation. Seventeenth century
courts probably conceptualized the situation differently and surely would not have identified
the proprietors as a corporation.
295. See 3 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 17, at 483 (passing land to corporate successors
was one of earliest corporate characteristics).
296. 1 Mass. 159 (1804).
297. Id. at 162.
298. Id. at 161-62.
299. Id at 162-64.
300. Id at 161-62 (Sewall, J., dissenting) (arguing that no corporation can claim benefits
from acts of individuals unless it made the acts its own).
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new powers. 301
Cases involving the relationship of towns to parishes were more
common. These cases involved a variety of issues, including that of
whether an individual owed taxes to both the town and the parish.
In New England, as in many places in England, towns and parishes
originally were coterminous.30 2 As one court stated, "[u]nder the
colony charter no man could be a freeman, unless he was a church
member, until the year 1662; and a majority of the church consti-
tuted a majority of the legal voters of the town."303 Another court
noted in 1796 that "[elvery town incorporated by law contains in it
all the rights, powers and privileges of an ecclesiastical society, and
are subject to all duties: and so long as they remain one entire body
may manage their ecclesiastical concerns in town meetings . . 04
With the Great Awakening and other pressures towards religious di-
versity, however, towns gradually lost their religious unanimity.
Daniels describes new parish creation in the eighteenth century as
reaching "epidemic proportions." °3 0 5 By 1807, according to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court:
[i]ndeed, a town may, and most commonly does, contain more or
less inhabitants of a different religious denomination from that of
the parish. They have no concern in the affairs of the parish, but
they have all the rights of other inhabitants as to the affairs of the
town. Accordingly, it is generally practiced to hold distinct meet-
ings for the two objects.
306
The town and the parish were often identified as distinct "incorpo-
rations." 30 7 Because the town and the parish were different corpo-
rations, the parish continued to exist even if a town was
subsequently incorporated containing identical lands. Thus, the
cases held, a subsequent incorporation of a new town or parish did
not release the inhabitants of the new town or parish from duties
already incurred308 or abrogate the rights of the original town or
301. Proprietors of Monumoi Great Beach v. Rogers, I Mass. 159, 163 (1804). Few town
division cases appeared as late as the 19th century. But they must have been common a cen-
tury earlier as town after town faced the issue of ownership of the commons. Although these
cases require further research, they probably played an important role in the analysis of New
England towns as corporations.
302. B. DANIELS, supra note 284, at 95; L. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONwEALTH AND
CHIEFJUSTICE SHAW 48-50 (1957).
303. Avery v. Inhabitants ofTyringham, 3 Mass. 160, 180 (1809); see also B. DAMELS, supra
note 284, at 95.
304. Selectmen of Cornwall v. Pierce, 2 Root 431, 433 (Conn. 1796).
305. B. DANIELS, supra note 284, at 35.
306. Dillingham v. Snow, 3 Mass. 276, 279 (1807).
307. The court in Dillingham v. Snow stated "[the] incompatibility of the two incorpora-
tions. . . seems to. . . require the continuance of each for the preservation of their distinct
property and privileges, and to answer the several purposes of their creation." Id. at 282-83.
308. See, e.g., Inhabitants of Harrison v. Inhabitants of Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 15, 17 (1819)
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parish.30 9
A third major context in which courts analyzed towns as "corpora-
tions" involved town partition cases. Both in Connecticut and Mas-
sachusetts, many towns "hived ofW''310 from existing towns in the
1770's and 1780's. The town partition cases often involved the
question of which entity-the old town or the new-was responsible
for maintenance of a pauper. New England's system of poor relief
required the town of the pauper's "settlement" to support him. If
the pauper had a settlement in a particular town which was later
partitioned into two new towns, courts required the original town to
support the pauper because, upon incorporation, support of pau-
pers became a corporate responsibility. One court that adhered to
this policy explained that "[t]his principle [was] . . .deduced from
the nature of corporate rights and duties ... .
4. Massachusetts towns as "quasi" or "municipal" corporations
Despite the courts' references to "corporations," the sense in
which Massachusetts towns were corporations remained unclear in
1800. In the first two decades of the nineteenth century, courts clar-
ified the relationship between Massachusetts towns and English cor-
poration law.
In defining the relationship between their towns and "corpora-
(new town not released from obligation to support ministry); Eager v. Inhabitants of Marlbor-
ough, 10 Mass. 430, 432-33 (1813) (pre-division decision to build meeting-house enforceable
against first parish, although meeting-house located in second parish); Dillingham v. Snow, 3
Mass. 276, 282-83 (1807) (incorporation of new parish does not suspend or abolish obligation
to support public worship).
309. See, e.g., Inhabitants of the First Parish in Medford v. Pratt, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 221,
226 (1826) (original parish retained exclusive right to use meetinghouse for public worship
following incorporation of second parish); Inhabitants of the First Parish in Shapleigh v.
Gilman, 13 Mass. 189, 191 (1816) (original parish retains right to land designated for use as a
parsonage).
310. B. DANIELS, supra note 284, at 35.
311. Inhabitants of Windham v. Inhabitants of Portland, 4 Mass. 384, 390 (1808). This is
a statement of the law that many courts applied in the absence of relevant statutes. Statutes
could, and sometimes did, change the obligations involved. In Inhabitants of Windham, for
example, one of the statutes in question provided that
upon division of towns or districts, every person having a legal settlement therein,
but being removed therefrom at the time of the division, and not having gained a
new settlement elsewhere, shall have his settlement in that town or district, wherein
his former dwelling-place or home shall happen to fall upon such division.
Id. at 388 (citing Statute of 1793, ch. 34). This act did not apply in Inhabitants of Windham,
however, because the division in question occurred prior to enactment of the statute. Id.; see
also Inhabitants of Lancaster v. Inhabitants of Sutton, 16 Mass. 112, 113-14 (1819) (enforcing
provision of partition statute that required original town to maintain pauper unless he termi-
nated his settlement with that town according to specific statutory procedure); Inhabitants of
Norton v. Inhabitants of Mansfield, 16 Mass. 48, 51 (1819) (enforcing provision in partition
act that provided that new town should "bear their proportionate part of supporting the
poor. ... )
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tions," Massachusetts courts turned to the long-established political
discourse that had divorced the terms "incorporation" and "corpo-
rate" from the technical and preclusive meanings the terms had in
England and New York.312 Courts thus had a "commonsense" ar-
gument that "incorporation" meant something different in New
England than it did at common law. Moreover, because New Eng-
land used the term "incorporation" to refer to the procedure that au-
thorized a group of settlers to act as a town, post-Revolutionary
New England courts inherited what courts in England and New York
so sorely lacked: a legal language tied into contemporary political
practice.
Once Massachusetts courts faced the intellectual challenge of de-
fining the relationship between their use of the words "corporate"
and "corporation" and the traditional uses of these words in English
law, the courts concluded that towns were a special type of "munici-
pal" or "quasi" corporation. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court first held that towns were municipal corporations in two 1816
cases, Rumford v. Wood313 and Stetson v. Kempton.314
The conclusion of the Massachusetts courts that towns were mu-
nicipal corporations represented an important shift in the use of the
word "municipal." In the eighteenth century, the term "municipal"
existed in the political vocabulary but was not used to refer to local
government units. Hartog explains that "[i]n Blackstone's Commen-
taries, 'municipal laws' represented the English equivalent of thejus
civil of continental law, a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the
Supreme power of the state, commanding what is right and prohib-
iting what is wrong." 315 American law adopted this usage. Kent's
Commentaries used the term "municipal law" to refer to the law regu-
lating the internal affairs of a nation or state.316
In Massachusetts at the turn of the nineteenth century, ChiefJus-
tice Parsons317 of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court began
consistently to use the word "municipal" in cases in which he com-
pared the narrow powers of parishes with the broader "municipal"
312. Most lawyers and educated people would have known what a true corporation was.
For example, Thomas Jefferson owned two books in his private collection that discussed the
history of English boroughs: Robert Brady's An Historical Treatise of Cities and Burghs or Boroughs
(London 1704), and Thomas Madox, Firma Burgi (London 1726). Catalogue of the Thomas
Jefferson Collection, Library of Congress.
313. 13 Mass. 193 (1816).
314. 13 Mass. 271 (1816).
315. H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 190 (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAws OF ENGLAND 44-53 (London 1765-69)).
316. Id at 190 (quoting 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw *419-508).
317. Theophilus Parsons (1750-1813) was Chief Justice of Massachusetts from 1806 to
1813.
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powers of Massachusetts towns. As early as 1804, Massachusetts
courts had developed the principle that parishes had only statutorily
granted powers.318 A Massachusetts court refused to hear an attor-
ney who argued otherwise: "[t]he court[s] were so clear that par-
ishes had no powers except those given by statutes. . . they would
not permit the counsel to proceed in his argument-saying it was
like arguing against a first principle, and respecting which there had
never been any doubt."3 19 Chief Justice Parsons applied the term
"municipal corporation" as early as 1809 when he reasserted the
broad nature of town powers as opposed to parish powers: "Par-
ishes are incorporated with a very few powers and duties . ..
Towns are municipal corporations, with power to assess and collect
money for the maintenance of schools and of the poor, and for the
making and repairing roads, and for some other purposes. ' 320
The term "quasi corporation," which Massachusetts courts even-
tually came to use interchangeably with "municipal corporation,"
developed independently. The term had appeared in Men of
Devon,32' which Massachusetts courts read as holding that unincor-
porated local units were quasi corporations.3 22 In an early post-
Revolutionary case involving private corporations, Chief'Justice Par-
sons applied the quasi corporation language: "We distinguish be-
tween proper aggregate corporations, and the inhabitants of any
district, who are by statute invested with particular powers without
their consent. These are in the books sometimes called quasi corpo-
rations. Of this description are counties, and hundreds in England;
and counties, towns, & c. in this state."' 323
Two years later, in 1812, an attorney cited to Men of Devon in a
case involving a town's tort liability.324 The court's opinion once
again set up an opposition between "corporations created for their
own benefit" and "quasi corporations," and linked Massachusetts
town powers with state statutory authority. 325
318. Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass. 181, 189 (1804).
319. Id
320. Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547, 553-54 (1809).
321. Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788);seesupra notes
118-26 and accompanying text (discussing Men of Devon).
322. See, e.g., Riddle v. Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on Merrimack River, 7 Mass.
169, 187 (1810) (asserting that English courts had held towns to be quasi corporations). In
fact, of course, American courts miscited Men of Devon, which had used the term "quasi corpo-
ration" in rejecting an attorney's argument that unincorporated local units were quasi corpo-
rations. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (discussing Men of Devon).
323. Riddle v. Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on Merrimack River, 7 Mass. 169, 186-
87 (1810).
324. Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
325. Id. at 250.
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Chief Justice Parsons' successor, Issac Parker,326 redefined the
terms "municipal" and "quasi" corporations and introduced the
principle that towns as well as parishes had only those powers
granted by statute. In doing so, Parker (who was not shy about
changing law to suit the needs of the new republic)3 27 miscited Par-
sons' decisions as precedent for his novel holdings in Rumford v.
Wood 328 and Stetson v. Kempton,3 29 both decided in 1816.
In Rumford v. Wood 330 the central issue was whether a school dis-
trict had sufficient corporate powers to sign a lease on its own behalf
and to sue on a contract to build a schoolhouse. 331 The argument
of the school district's attorney contained one of the few cites to Kyd
that appears in the local government context in the Massachusetts
Reports.3 32 Because school districts did not exist at common law,
and because Massachusetts had decided few cases involving school
districts, the school district's attorney naturally returned to corpora-
tion law, which was still the only general rubric available in the An-
glo-American system for conceptualizing local government units.
An attorney arguing a case involving a town might simply have cited
town powers cases and avoided making an explicit assumption that
towns were corporations because of pervasive uncertainty about the
sense in which towns were corporations. In Rumford, however, the
attorney had no choice but to assert explicitly that English law con-
tinued to be relevant because the school district was a corporation.
The attorney began by quoting the principle that "no certain pre-
scribed form of words is necessary to create a corporation. ' 33 3 He
asserted that the words of the statute of 1799 establishing school
districts contained sufficient words of incorporation. 33 4 Moreover,
"when a corporation is duly created, all other incidents are tacitly
annexed to it.''33 5 School districts, therefore, were corporations ca-
326. Issac Parker was Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from
1814 to 1830.
327. See M. HoRwrrz, supra note 132, at 26, 49, 57-58, 72-74 (recounting frequent exam-
ples of Parker ignoring precedent in favor of "instrumentalist" arguments).
328. 13 Mass. 193 (1816).
329. 13 Mass. 272 (1816).
330. 13 Mass. 193 (1816).
331. Id. at 193.
332. Id at 194 (citing Kyd for proposition that no prescribed form of words necessary to
create corporation).
333. Id
334. See id. at 195. The attorney pointed to various sections of the statute of 1799 that
empowered the majority of the school district's inhabitants to bind the minority in voting on
matters affecting the school district. Id. He then asserted that a majority's power to bind the
minority is "of the very nature and essence of a corporation." Id
335. Id. at 194-95.
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pable both of holding lands and of instituting lawsuits incident to
their land holdings.
The response of opposing counsel shows that, although the
school district's attorney probably had no choice but to base his ar-
gument on English corporation law, that strategy had entailed sub-
stantial risks:
The cases cited for the plaintiffs from the English books, as they
respect the manner in which a corporation can be created by the
king, can have little or no application in this country. They are all
grants by the king to the subject of parts of the royal prerogative:
chiefly of commercial privileges, which, in favour of the subject,
have received a liberal exposition. Our statutes respecting
schools are not to be considered as favours, sparingly imparted by
the sovereign to his subject: but rather as declarations, by the leg-
islature, of the manner in which a public duty is to be discharged.
The intention of the legislature, therefore, is the only object of
inquiry.3
36
The lawyer opposing the school district then refuted the argument
that the statute establishing school districts conveyed corporate
powers. He argued that such a broad definition of corporations
would mean that "the tenants of prison limits are corporations: for
the same language, in substance, is adopted in authorizing the
Courts of Sessions to fix and determine the limits of jail yards."
37
ChiefJustice Parker's opinion leaves no doubt that Rumford was a
difficult case. He reported that "[t]his cause has been some time
before us; there having been, at the several consultations we have
had upon it, doubts upon the mind of some or other of the court, as
to the effect of the arguments submitted in writing."3398 After com-
plementing counsel on both sides for having "ingeniously applied
the legal principles and reasoning belonging to the subject,"33 9
Parker concluded that the school district was not a common-law cor-
poration.3 40 Instead, he categorized both towns and school districts
as "quasi corporations." 34' 1 School districts and towns, he asserted,
are not "bodies politic and corporate, with the general powers of
336. Id. at 196.
337. lME As a final argument, the attorney opposing the school district argued that the
school districts are not corporations because they are set up and controlled by towns, not by
the state legislature: "It is among the inseparable incidents of a corporation, that it can be
erected and controlled by the sovereign authority only." Id (citing I W. BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 500 (London 1765-69)). This is an early instance of the
cross-over of this doctrine from private corporation cases to cases involving local government
units.
338. Rumford v. Wood, 13 Mass. 193, 196 (1816).
339. Ia at 198.
340. Id. at 197.
341. Id-
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corporations. . [Both] are yet deficient in many of the powers in-
cident to the general character of corporations." 342 Pointing out
the specific differences between "those corporations which exist at
common law" and "our municipal corporations," Parker warned
that "it will not do, therefore, to apply the strict principles of law
respecting corporations, in all cases, to these aggregate bodies,
which are created by statute in this commonwealth.
'" 3 43
In Rumford Parker used Parsons' terminology very differently from
the way Parsons had used it. Although Parsons used the terms "mu-
nicipal corporations" and "municipal powers" to refer to Massachu-
setts towns, Parker used the terms as generic categories that included
both towns and school districts in contradistinction to corporations
at common law,3 44 by which he meant borough corporations.
Parker also began to give more substance to the concept of "munici-
pal" or "quasi corporation," terms he used interchangeably. He
looked to existing statutes to define the powers of municipal corpo-
rations, although he also asserted that such corporations could have
powers by "usage." Municipal corporations "may be considered
under our institutions as quasi corporations; with limited powers co-
extensive with the duties imposed upon them by statute or usage:
but restrained from the general use of the authority, which belongs
to these metaphysical persons by the common law . .. 345
Many of the important statements in Rumford were dicta, but it
was not long before Chief Justice Parker had a second opportunity
to define the nature and powers of municipal corporations. In Stet-
son v. Kempton, 346 which the court handed down two months after
Rumford,3 47 Parker held that Massachusetts towns were municipal
corporations with only those powers given by statute.
Stetson involved a challenge to a war tax that the Town of
Fairhaven had levied during the War of 1812.348 The attorney for
the plaintiff taxpayer adopted Parker's suggestion that towns were
municipal corporations and asserted that "the powers of our munic-
ipal corporations are wholly derived from our statutes." 349 This
claim directly conflicted with Parker's statement in Rumford that
342. ld at 198.
343. Id at 199.
344. Id
345. Id. at 198-99. Parker's assertion that towns had certain powers by usage may well
have been related to the English vestry meeting's right to legislate by custom. See 1 B. & S.
WEBB, supra note 94, at 39 (discussing rights of vestry meetings).
346. 13 Mass. 272 (1816).
347. Rumford was decided in the May term of 1816, Rumford v. Wood, 13 Mass. 193
(1816); Stetson was decided the followingJuly, Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272 (1816).
348. Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272, 273 (1816).
349. Id at 273.
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towns had limited powers "coextensive with the duties imposed
upon them by statutes or usage."35 0 Massachusetts lawyers and
courts had, of course, looked to town acts and other statutes to de-
termine questions of town authority for decades, if not centuries.35'
Yet the lawyer's argument was novel in its assertion that towns had
only powers derived from statutes. The lawyer clearly was aware that
his claim was tenuous. In an attempt to meet and disarm an asser-
tion that the towns had powers by usage, the attorney argued that
The practice of towns during the revolutionary war may perhaps
be cited in support of the act of the town [in passing the war tax]
...[b]ut that was a period of confusion and anarchy, from which
precedents cannot be drawn in times of settled order and govern-
ment. Towns then, at one time or another, exercised almost all
the powers of sovereignty. By the Constitution of the United States,
the power of raising and supporting armies, and all necessary con-
comitant powers, are vested exclusively in Congress. The com-
mon defence is committed to that body, and all necessary means
for that object. It can, then, make no portion of the necessary ex-
penses of our towns.
352
The taxpayer's attorney also felt compelled to address the tradi-
tional approach of New England courts before Rumford to cases in-
volving challenges to town actions. An apt example of this earlier
approach appears in Hitchcock v. Town of Litchfeld,3 53 a 1790 Con-
necticut case involving a challenge to a tax the town levied to pay
Revolutionary War soldiers.35 4 The most interesting feature of the
decision in Hitchcock is its failure to discuss the town's power to vote
the tax. The court upheld the tax by asserting that a "legal town
meeting" had assessed it.35 This was the traditional inquiry in
cases involving a challenge to an exercise of town powers. 35 6 The
taxpayer's attorney in Stetson, however, assured the court that this
approach was no longer viable:
[N]othing can be inferred from the fact agreed in the case, that
this money was voted at a legal meeting of the town .. . . An
unauthorized vote of a town can confer no powers on the asses-
sors of such town, nor can it screen them from the regular conse-
350. Rumford v. Wood, 13 Mass. 193, 198 (1816).
351. 1636 Mass. Town Act, THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 50-51 (1648 &
reprint 1929).
352. Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272, 274 (1816).
353. 1 Root 206 (Conn. 1790).
354. Id
355. Id
356. See, e.g., Craigie v. Mellen, 6 Mass. 7, 17-18 (1809) (eminent domain proceeding au-
thorized by legitimate town meeting).
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quences of an illegal act.357
The final argument of the taxpayer's attorney was that "parishes
are as much corporations, and have as high and comprehensive an
authority over the parishioners, as towns' bylaws have over their in-
habitants." 358 Because the parishes could not vote a tax such as the
one at issue here, neither could the town.359 The plaintiff's attorney
miscited cases in which Parsons had contrasted parish powers with
"municipal power."3 60 Parsons had compared town and parish
powers to stress how much broader were town than parish powers,
but the attorney in Stetson cited the limited powers of parishes as au-
thority for his assertion that towns, as another species of municipal
corporation, also had limited powers.
361
Chief Justice Parker agreed with the plaintiff taxpayer's assertion
that the central issue of the case was whether the town had the legal
authority to tax its inhabitants to support a militia. Parker wrote
that "[t]he principal question, which arises out of these facts is
whether the inhabitants of the town of Fairhaven had lawful right
and authority, in their corporate capacity, to raise money. . . to give
additional wages to the militia, and for other purposes of de-
fense." 36 2 Parker then proceeded to modify in a highly significant
respect the formulation he had developed only two months earlier
in Rumford concerning the scope of town powers. Although in Rum-
ford Parker had asserted that Massachusetts towns had both powers
given by statute and powers given by usage, in Stetson Parker ac-
cepted the suggestion of the taxpayer's attorney that towns had only
powers given by statute: "the powers of towns, as well as parishes,
are either entirely derived from some legislative act, or defined and
limited by the general statutes, prescribing the powers and duties of
both classes of corporations." 36 3 Parker continued, "Whether it
would be wise to extend and multiply the objects, for which towns
may be authorized to raise money, is a question for the legislature,
and not for us, to decide. . . towns now being creatures of legisla-
tion, and enjoying only the powers which are expressly granted to
them." 364
357. Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272, 275, 277 (1816).
358. I at 277.
359. The plaintiff's attorney cited to the court's earlier holding in Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass.
181 (1804). There the court held that parishes could only raise funds for purposes necessarily
connected to objectives sanctioned by statute. Id at 190-91.
360. Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272, 274 (1816). For a discussion of the earlier cases
decided by Parsons, see supra notes 317-23 and accompanying text.
361. Id at 277-78.
362. Id at 278.
363. Id at 281.
364. Id at 284.
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Parker thus took the principle, established by Parsons, that par-
ishes have only statutorily conferred powers and generalized it by
inventing a generic category of municipal corporations that in-
cluded both towns and parishes.3 65 Parsons, in turn, had derived the
principle that parishes "have no authority to grant moneys, except
for the objects specifically expressed in [their enabling act] and for
the purposes necessarily connected with those objects" from cases involving
private corporations.3 66 Commentators normally cite the principle
that corporations were "creatures of legislation" with only statutory
powers to United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Marshall's
1804 opinion in Headv. Providence Insurance Company.367 In that case,
Marshall stated of the private corporation involved:
[T]his body. . . in its corporate capacity, is the mere creature of
the act to which it owes its existence .. . . [I]t may correctly be
said to be precisely what the incorporating act has made it, to de-
rive all its powers from that act, and to be capable of exerting its
faculties only in the manner which that act authorizes.
3 68
Thus, when Parsons cited this principle in the parish cases, he was
proceeding on the assumption that parishes were the same type of
corporations as the flood of private corporations that state legisla-
tures were then creating.
3 69
In both Rumford and Stetson Parker stressed the similarity between
private and municipal corporations. The point comes through most
clearly in Rumford. Directly after Parker stressed the dissimilarity be-
tween quasi corporations and "these metaphysical persons by the
common law,"370 he focused on the similarities between municipal
and private corporations. One important similarity was that both
were created by statutes.
[A]ll the numerous corporations, which have been from time to
time created by various acts of the legislature ... [enjoy] the
power, which is expressly bestowed upon them; and perhaps, in
all instances where the act is silent, possessing by necessary impli-
cation the authority which is requisite to execute the purposes of
their creation.
371
365. Id. at 283. As did the attorney for the taxpayer, Parker miscited Parson's cases to
support his holding. Id
366. Id. at 278-79 (citing Bangs v. Snow, I Mass. 187 (1804)).
367. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 127 (1804).
368. Id at 167.
369. See COMMONwEALTn, supra note 26, at 106-33 (describing rapid creation of busines
corporations in late 18th and early 19th century Massachusetts). See also R. SEAvoY, supra not
189, at 65-67 (describing rapid creation of diversified incorporations in New York followin
enactment of 1811 general incorporation statute).
370. Rumford v. Wood, 13 Mass. 193, 198-99 (1816).
371. Id at 199. In Stetson, Parker again miscited the parish cases to support the propo
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Although at one level Parker stressed the similarity between private
corporations and towns, at another level he assumed a dichotomy
between public and private corporations. Indeed, Parker's assump-
tion that municipal corporations were public entities was probably
the most important principle underlying Stetson v. Kempton. Towns
had power under the Town Act, Parker said, to "raise such sums as
should be necessary to meet the ordinary expenses of the year."3 72
Parker's attempt to define "ordinary" town expenses plunged him
directly into an effort to define public-and, therefore, authorized-
as opposed to private-and, therefore, unauthorized-activities.3 73
In contrast to borough corporations with their mix of public and
private rights and duties, Parker clearly considered the activities of
municipal corporations to be confined to the public sphere:
The erection of the public buildings for the accommodation of the
inhabitants, such as town houses to assemble in, and market-
houses for the sale of provisions, may also be a proper town
charge, and may come within the fair meaning of the word neces-
sary: for these may be essential to the comfort and convenience of
the citizens. But it cannot be supposed that the building of a thea-
ter, a circus, or any other place of mere amusement, at the ex-
pense of the town, could be justified under the term necessary town
charges. Nor the inhabitants be lawfully taxed for the purpose of
raising a statute, or monument; these being matters of taste and
not necessity: unless in populous and wealthy towns, they should
be thought suitable ornaments to buildings or squares, the raising
and maintenance of which are within the duty and care of the gov-
ernors or officers of the town.374
Parker's assumption that municipal corporations were purely pub-
lic suggests that Massachusetts courts had gone a substantial dis-
tance towards assimilating the public/private distinction into
corporation law by 1816. In fact, the bifurcation of corporations into
public and private had begun in Massachusetts in the first decade of
the nineteenth century.375 Two important early opinions consid-
ered whether the charter inviolability doctrine protected Massachu-
setts corporations. Chief Justice Parsons held that charter
inviolability protected private corporations in Wales v. Stetson in
tion that towns had only those powers granted by statute. Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272,
281 (1816).
372. Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272, 278-79 (1816).
373. Id at 278-79.
374. Id at 279.
375. Thus, the bifurcation of corporations into public and private began in Massachusetts
substantially before the Supreme Court decided Dartmouth College in 1819. See infra note 399
and accompanying text (arguing that bifurcation of public and private corporations began in
Massachusetts before Dartmouth College).
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1806.376 Although Parsons did not explicitly state that charter invi-
olability did not apply to towns, this conclusion evidently was obvi-
ous to his contemporaries. 377 An 1802 Opinion of the
Massachusetts Attorney General (1802 Opinion) suggests the rea-
son. The opinion stated explicitly that charter inviolability did not
apply to towns because towns were not corporations like private
corporations.
378
The 1802 Opinion did not designate what kind of corporations
towns were: ChiefJustice Parker did not invent the municipal corpo-
ration until 1816. Yet Wales v. Stetson and the 1802 Attorney Gen-
eral's Opinion appear to reflect a growing consensus in early
nineteenth century Massachusetts that towns were different from
business corporations. Although neither Wales nor the 1802 Opin-
ion articulated the modern public/private distinction, Justice Parker
came close to doing so in Ellis v. Marshall379 in 1807. Ellis involved a
corporation formed to construct a street and considered whether
such a corporation could compel an owner of adjacent land to con-
tribute funds for street construction. Parker defined the issue as
whether the corporation could compel the landowner to become a
member of the corporation and consequently become liable for the
assessment levied on members. 380 Parker noted that the issue in
Ellis "requires that we should ascertain the true nature and charac-
ter [of the act setting up the corporation]. If it were a public act,
predicated upon a view to the general good, the question would be
more difficult. 381 But, Parker held, the legislature clearly could not
compel membership in a corporation "for the promotion of a private
enterprise. ' 3 8
2
A comparison of Wales v. Stetson, the 1802 Attorney General's
Opinion, and Ellis v. Marshall, with Rumford v. Wood and Stetson v.
Kempton, suggests that by 1816 Massachusetts courts had taken sub-
stantial steps toward formulating the modern public/private
distinction.3
83
376. 2 Mass. 143, 146 (1806).
377. Cf id at n.a. Parsons warned that every legislative grant reserved an implied right to
take the grant for a public use. Id. Parsons' assertion might have carried the implication that
towns, which derived their authority from the state, were subject to changes in their charters
by the state. In any event, this author found no cases in which Massachusetts towns claimed
that charter inviolability protected their town charters.
378. Opinion of the Attorney General on the Life of the Corporation (1802), reprinted in COMMON-
WEALTH, supra note 26, at 54-61, app. D.
379. 2 Mass. 269 (1807).
380. Ide at 275.
381. Id. at 276 (emphasis added).
382. Id. at 277 (emphasis added).
383. I am grateful to Hendrik Hartog, who with characteristic generosity focused my at-
tention on the implications of Ellis v. Marshall, Wales v. Stetson and the 1802 Attorney General's
430
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Nonetheless, Parker's holdings in Rumford v. Wood and Stetson v.
Kempton does not mean that in 1816 he offered a fully developed
version of late nineteenth century municipal corporation law. Yet
the cases stated three important conclusions. Most basic was Rum-
ford v. Wood's use of the term "municipal corporations" to hold that
towns were part of a generic group of entities, in contrast to the
earlier view that only by specific charters could towns gain corporate
powers. 38 4 Second was the holding that municipal corporations
were purely public entities, in contrast to traditional corporate bor-
oughs that combined public and private roles.385 Both these
changes, which Hartog links with the institutional transformation of
New York City,386 in fact took place much earlier in Massachusetts.
Stetson's final holding, that municipal corporations had only those
powers granted by state statute, was an early articulation of Dillon's
Rule,3 8 7 which many consider the core doctrine of city powerless-
ness. Although the modem version of Dillon's Rule goes beyond
Stetson's holding to add that courts must strictly construe statutes
granting cities powers,388 Stetson is one of the earliest cases thatJohn
F. Dillon cited in support of his Rule in the first American treatise
on municipal corporation law in 1872.389
CONCLUSION
A close reading of the case law suggests that lawyers from New
York and Massachusetts saw the major legal issues surrounding
town and city status very differently in the period from 1800 to
1830. Denton v. Jackson,390 a New York case that Chancellor Kent
decided one year after Rumford and Stetson (in 1817), sharply demon-
Opinion, when juxtaposed with Stetson v. Kempton. For a more detailed discussion of the role of
Ellis v. Marshal4 Wales v. Stetson and related cases in the development of the law of business
corporations, see COMMONWEALTH, supra note 26, at 134-60, and M. HoRwrrz, supra note 132,
at 111-14.
384. Rumford v. Wood, 13 Mass. 193, 199 (1816). Local lawyers quickly adopted the
term "municipal corporation." See, e.g., Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272, 273 (1816).
385. See supra notes 374-75 and accompanying text.
386. H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 180-81 (discussing development of generic category of
municipal corporations after 1856); id- at 259-64 (discussing traditional mix of public and
private roles as late as 1860's in New York). For a discussion of how the 1807 commissioner's
map for New York assisted in furthering the public-private distinction, see id. at 67-75.
387. SeeJ. DILLON, supra note 7, at 101-02. For a statement of Dillon's Rule, see infra text
accompanying note 401. See H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 223 (suggesting Dillon's Rule is the
"symbolic center" of the modem law of city powerlessness).
388. Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 271, 278 (1816).
389. The only earlier case Dillon cited is Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass. 187 (1804), the parish
case that Parker miscited. See supra notes 358 & 365 and accompanying text (asserting that
Parker miscited Bangs v. Snow). Dillon consistently miscited Bangs v. Snow. SeeJ. DILLON, supra
note 7, at 103 (citing Bangs v. Snow).
390. 2 Johns. Ch. 320 (N.Y. Ch. 1817).
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strates this divergence. In Denton Kent made an argument very simi-
lar to Parker's assertion that towns were in fact corporations.3 91
Yet, whereas Parker's assertion that towns were "municipal" corpo-
rations was brilliant in Massachusetts-which is to say it was an ex-
tension of accepted law that was immediately convincing-Kent's
argument in Denton was considered unconvincing: subsequent New
York courts never mentioned it.392
The difference between the two states' law was pervasive. In New
England the description of town status from English corporation
law seemed clearly wrong and the description of borough status
seemed irrelevant.3 93 Consequently, Massachusetts courts did not
view the English law as a single logical system the integrity of which
could not be disturbed.
Instead, Massachusetts courts felt free to pick and choose from
English corporation law those elements they would preserve and
those they would ignore. Massachusetts cases consistently reflect
this lack of concern for the rigors of English corporation law. Cites
to Kyd and other English treatise writers were rare, and, although
learned judges such as ChiefJustices Parsons and Parker were aware
of English doctrines, Massachusetts lawyers and courts did not have
the kind of technical mastery of English corporation law that was
commonplace in New York. The attitudes of Massachusetts lawyers
toward English law allowed Massachusetts judges to ignore that
law's predominant tendency to limit corporations to the historically
defined closed set of boroughs, and to mobilize instead the alterna-
tive but traditionally secondary theoretical definition of incorpora-
tion (as the political act that allowed a group to act in concert).
The uncritical attitude of New York courts towards English law
contrasts sharply with the approach of the Massachusetts courts.
391. Id at 324. Chancellor Kent developed his argument very differently from Parker for
he was a shrewd enough lawyer to sense that an assertion that towns were in fact corporations
was not going to be perceived as a strong argument in New York. Therefore, he used the
"towns are corporations" argument only to bolster a different argument that although towns
were not actually corporations, they had the rights to exercise certain corporate powers. Id.;
see supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text (discussing New York's rejection of Kent's
assertion).
392. New Yorkers developed Kent's alternative suggestion that towns were not in fact
corporations with full corporate powers; instead they were unincorporated groups that had
been given limited corporate powers as "corporations sub modo." Denton v.Jackson, 2 Johns.
Ch. 320, 324 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1817); see supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text (discussing
Denton v. Jackson).
393. English corporation law's preclusive claims implied that towns could not hold land,
sue and be sued, or exercise other corporate powers such as the ability to pass by-laws, see
supra notes 80-92 and accompanying text. These claims seemed clearly wrong in Massachu.
setts, where towns had long exercised these powers. The English law's definition of borough
powers seemed irrelevant in Massachusetts because boroughs had never existed there. See
supra note 265.
432
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Reference to Kyd's treatise was frequent in New York, and courts
were attentive to highly technical distinctions and to the traditional
rules defining corporate powers.3 94 Underlying the New York
courts' rigid adherence to English corporation law was the explosive
political issue of whether the charter inviolability provision applied
to New York City.
3 95
New York courts could have defused this political issue by pre-
serving the English law's claims with respect to the status of boroughs,
while rejecting its claims with respect to the status of towns. Instead,
the courts preserved English corporation law virtually intact. The
persistence of New York City as a borough meant that New Yorkers
continued to view the entire system of English corporation law-
built around the paradigm of the borough-as a viable doctrine with
continuing validity.39
6
The difference between New York and Massachusetts courts' as-
sertions that towns were quasi corporations is illustrative of the dif-
ference between the approaches of each state. Massachusetts courts
rejected the preclusive claims of English law and used the term
"quasi corporation" to define the kind of corporation that towns
were. New York courts used the term to explain why towns could
exercise certain limited corporate powers even though they were not
corporations. New Yorkers did not challenge the English law's
preclusive claims directly but, instead, treated towns as a counterex-
ample to the general rule that only boroughs were corporations.
The sharp differences between New York and Massachusetts law
394. For cites to Kyd's treatise, see e.g., Jansen v. Ostrander, I Cow. 670, 674 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1820) (attorney for the defendant) (discussing succession of public office); id at 680
(Woodworth, J., majority) (discussing succession of public office); id at 684 (Savage, CJ.,
concurring) (discussing succession of public office); Rouse v. Moore, 18 Johns. 407, 411, 417
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1820) (holding that when legislature creates public office, officer has implied
authority to bring suits incident to office); Jackson v. Hartwell, 8 Johns. 422, 425 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1811) (holding that county supervisors are pro tonto endowed with corporate capacity);
Jackson v. Plumbe, 8 Johns. 378, 378 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (directing nonsuit when corpora-
tion sues and did not prove that it is a corporation). For an example of the New York court's
preservation of a highly technical distinction from the English common law, see supra note
227 (courts insisting that if overseers were in any sense corporations, they were sole corpora-
tions). For New York cases applying traditional English rules of borough powers, see Hart v.
Mayor of Albany, 9 Wend. 571, 601-04 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832) (looking to English common law
to discern powers of borough); Furman v. Knapp, 19 Johns. 248, 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821)
(depending on English common law to prevent state from preempting city regulation); Mayor
of New York City v. Ordrenan, 12 Johns. 122, 124 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815) (citing to opinion of
Lord Mansfield as authority); Cortelyou v. VanBrundt, I Johns. 313, 313-14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1806) (using English common-law definition for "rights of Freemen").
395. See infra notes 138-59 and accompanying text (discussing treatment of New York
City's charter inviolability provision).
396. The analysis of the borough as a paradigm draws from the work of Thomas Kuhn. T.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvoLUrONS (1973). For sophisticated critiques and
commentary upon Kuhn, see G. GUTTING, PARADIGMS AND REvOLUTIONs (1980).
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raise interesting questions about the development of the pub-
lic/private distinction in American law. The traditional view is that
the distinction between public and private corporations was a bril-
liant insight of the Supreme Court in the Dartmouth College case in
1819.39 7 Hartog challenges this view, and focuses instead on the
process by which the purely public municipal corporation in New
York law between 1830 and 1860 replaced the borough, which had
mixed public and private roles.398 This Article suggests that Massa-
chusetts law assimilated the public/private distinction before both
Dartmouth College and the developments in New York law that Hartog
describes. Its tentative conclusion, that the public/private distinc-
tion developed very early in Massachusetts, has implications not
only for the history of the city but also for American political history
in general.3
99
This study is part of a larger effort to trace the startling transfor-
mation of English corporation law into Amnerican municipal corpo-
ration law during the eighty years between 1790 and 1870. By 1872
John F. Dillon, in the first treatise on American municipal corpora-
tion law, sought to portray a coherent body of doctrine the validity
of which stretched back to English common law.400 This Article
confirms Hartog's conclusion that English corporation law changed
substantially once it reached America. Yet a comparison of cases
from New York and Massachusetts suggests that Hartog considera-
bly oversimplified the process of legal change. Whereas Hartog ap-
pears to have assumed that regional differences were unimportant in
the development of the American law, in fact quite different bodies
of doctrine developed in New York and Massachusetts at the begin-
397. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 517 (1819).
398. See H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 205-39. Hartog shows that New York courts first
formally bifurcated corporations into public and private in 1835 in a case that was promptly
overruled. Id. (citing People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835), rev'd, Purdy v.
People, 4 Hill 384, 395 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842)). New York law did not finally accept the notion
that all towns and cities-including New York City-were public corporations until 1857. See
H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 209-39 (citing People ix rel. Wood v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532, 543
(1857)).
399. The suggestion that Massachusetts law began to assimilate the public/private distinc-
tion in the first decades of the 19th century may also suggest the need for a rethinking of the
Handlins' famous analysis of Massachusetts between the Revolution and the Civil War. The
Handlins sought to show that business corporations were viewed in Massachusetts not as pri-
vate but as public entities. See, e.g., COMMONWEALTH, supra note 26, at 138, 180 (references to
corporations as "organs of the state" and as "government agencies"). The Handlins' position
appears to contradict the assertion made here that business corporations were viewed as pri-
vate, in contrast to public municipal corporations, in the first decade of the 19th century. One
historian who has focused on the private nature of early 19th century Massachusetts business
corporations is Professor Morton J. Horwitz. See M. HoRwrrz, supra note 132, at 111-14.
Note that the Handlins were aware of the case law on which both Horwitz and this author base
their arguments. See COMMONWEALTH, supra note 26, at 134-60.
400. J. DILLON, supra note 7, at 18.
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ning of the nineteenth century. The central question for further re-
search is whether different state traditions continued to play an
important role in the law defining cities' legal status. Preliminary
research suggests that they did.
Dillon's original formulation of his rule in 1872 shows the influ-
ence of the Massachusetts case law on town powers. Dillon formu-
lated his rule as follows:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses, and can exercise, the following powers,
and no others: first, those granted in express words; second, those
necessarily or fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly
granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes
of the corporation-not simply convenient, but indispensable.
Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is
resolved by the courts against the corporation, and the power is
denied.4
0 1
Although commentators today usually interpret Dillon's Rule as im-
posing a sharp limit on municipal powers, Dillon's original formula-
tion was ambiguous. The first sentence in fact suggests a broad
construction of statutes granting cities power. Not only do cities
have powers expressly granted; they also have all powers fairly im-
plied, as well as those essential to their municipal purposes. The
second sentence-the rule of strict construction-suggests a nar-
rower construction of city powers than does the first.
No one has yet fully documented the origin and development of
these two opposing trends. Yet Dillon's cites are suggestive. One
of the earliest cases that Dillon cited in support of the broad formu-
lation of city powers is Stetson v. Kempton.402 This cite reflects the
fact that, by 1830, Massachusetts law had reconciled Stetson and
Rumford in a series of decisions that upheld the authority of New
England towns to exercise their broad traditional powers by "us-
age."'40 3 By contrast, the authority that Dillon cited for the rule of
strict construction suggests the continuing influence of New York
401. Id. at 101-02.
402. Id at 103; see supra notes 387-89 and accompanying text (discussing Dillon's use of
Stetson v. Kempton).
403. See, e.g., Allen v. Inhabitants of Taunton, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 485,489 (1837) (author-
ity to fix fire-engine is obvious); Willard v. Inhabitants of Newburyport, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.)
227, 232 (1831) (authority to fix town clock is a common necessity). In 1861 ChiefJustice
Bigelow, in what appears to be the first town powers case heard after Bigelow succeeded Shaw
as Chief Justice, held that Massachusetts towns did not have powers by usage: "abuse of
power and violations of right derive no sanction from time or custom." Hood v. Lynn, 83
Mass. (1 Allen) 103 (1861). It appears, however, that Massachusetts lawyers continued to ar-
gue that towns had certain powers by usage as late as 1907. See Attorney Gen. v. Stratton, 194
Mass. 51, 52, 79 N.E. 1073, 1073 (1907).
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law. 40 4 Thus the different case law traditions in New York and Mas-
sachusetts appear to have had continuing importance in shaping
American law.
Different state traditions appear to have had a second lasting im-
pact on the law. As Hartog documents, New York City's mix of pub-
lic and private powers eventually gave rise to the modern
governmental/proprietary distinction.405 Indeed, the governmen-
tal/proprietary distinction may well be a holdover from the lasting
conviction of New Yorkers that cities play both public and private
roles. This vision of the city appears to contradict the view of Mas-
sachusetts courts that towns were purely public. Although modem
local government law downplays the contradiction between the New
York courts' vision of cities as both private and public, and the Mas-
sachusetts courts' vision of towns as purely public, the two traditions
persist in local government, law today in uneasy combination.
This Article also contains some very preliminary suggestions con-
cerning why the law of city powerlessness developed as it did. It
suggests that the American law of city powerlessness was not an in-
evitable result of the rejection of the corporate borough and of Eng-
lish corporation law. In fact, when the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court first replaced the analysis of the borough with that of
the municipal corporation, the municipal corporation was still an
empty vessel.406 "A rethinking of the legal nature of the city may
have been inevitable, but what determined the content of the new
judicial doctrine?" 40 7 Hartog focuses his explanation upon "the
nineteenth-century middle-class movement to control and remake
the American city."'40 8
This Article suggests that the initial stirrings of the law of city
powerlessness may not have arisen in cases involving major Ameri-
can cities. In fact, the appearance in Stetson v. Kempton of an early
form of Dillon's Rule suggests that the impulse of American courts
to constrict the local governments' powers arose in cases involving
small New England towns long before the desire to control the pro-
404. Dillon cites to a Supreme Court opinion written by Justice Samuel Nelson. See J.
DILLON, supra note 7, at 102 (citing Minturn v. Lame, 23 How. 435, 64 U.S. 638 (1859)).
Nelson was, before joining the United States Supreme Court, a very influential state court
judge in New York. For background on Nelson's role in the development of the municipal law
of New York, see H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 207-16.
405. H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 181-82.
406. In fact, Stetson and Rumford expressed very different views of the municipal corpora-
tions' powers. Compare supra notes 346-65 and accompanying text (discussing Stetson) with supra
notes 330-45 and accompanying text (discussing Rumford).
407. H. HARTOG, supra note 8, at 262.
408. Id. (citing P. BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 1820-1920
(1978)).
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cess of urbanization began to play a major role on the American
scene.409
The court's decision in Stetson stems not from the court's concerns
about the threats that cities might pose. Instead, the court's atten-
tion seems focused upon the proper scope of government in gen-
eral. Parker's constriction of town powers in Stetson appears to be
part of a larger national debate about the proper scope of govern-
mental power when the exercise of such power threatened private
property interests.
Dillon demonstrated similar concern with the threat that town
governments posed to private property. Dillon's focus, like Parker's,
was not on the government of major cities. Dillon's interest in local
government law arose from cases in which towns large and small
voted to issue bonds to help finance railroads during the period
from 1830 to 1870.410 Preliminary evidence suggests that Dillon's
Rule became an established tenet in cases involving the authority of
towns to impose taxes on private individuals to finance railroads and
other improvements. 4 1
1
Thus, Stetson v. Kempton and Dillon's Rule suggest that the na-
tional debate on the limits of governmental power in derogation of
property rights may well have played a persistent role in the devel-
opment of city powerlessness. If nightmares about city power
proved influential in defining the nature of the municipal corpora-
tion, however, so too did Jeffersonian dreams of the glories of self-
government exercised at the local level. 4 12 It is still unclear how
409. Stetson v. Kempton involved the town of Fairhaven, which had a population of 2,733 in
1820. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOURTH DECENNIAL CENSUS: 1820.
410. Dillon's desire to protect private property from governmental power is well estab-
lished. E.g., A. PAUL, THE CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAw 27-29, 78-81 (1960)
(referring to Dillon as a laissez-faire extremist); Dillon, Property-Its Rights and Duties in Our
Legal and Social Systems, 29 AM. L. REv. 161 (1895); Frug, supra note 11, at 1109-11. Dillon was
the foremost bonding lawyer of his day. A. PAUL, supra, at 78.
411. Stetson v. Kempton was, of course, an early case involving towns' ability to impose taxes
on private individuals. See supra notes 346-69 and accompanying text (discussing Stetson).
Cases involving towns' authority to impose a tax to buy stock or otherwise help finance rail-
roads were the most common type of mid-19th century case involving the issue of a town's
authority to impose taxes. For a listing of mid-19th century bonding cases, see J. DILLON,
supra note 7, at 144-50. For examples of bonding cases debating the construction of Dillon's
Rule, see e.g., Nichols v. Mayor of Nashville, 9 Hum. 171, 177-79, 28 Tenn. 252, 262-63
(1848) (debating whether a statute that authorized Nashville to own stock in a railroad should
be strictly construed); City of Bridgeport v. Housatonac, 15 Conn. 475, 489 (1843) (debating
whether Bridgeport's charter allowed issuance of bonds to finance a railroad); Bank v. Chil-
licothe, 7 Ohio (Part I) 31 (1836) (attorneys for both sides arguing conflicting clauses of
Dillon's Rule).
412. TheJeffersonian romance with government at the local level was fully developed in
the mid-19th century work of Thomas Cooley, who presented the principal alternative to Dil-
Ion's version of municipal corporation law. See T. CooLEY, TREATISE ON CONSTrrTONAL LIM-
rrATIONS 201 (1871). For background on Cooley's theory of the inherent right to local
government, see Eaton, The Right to Local Government, 13 HARV. L. REv. 20 (1900). For the
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these national debates interacted with each other and with local tra-
ditions, and how both interacted with private corporation law.
It is too early to say what "caused" the law of city powerlessness
to predominate in America. An attempt to provide such an explana-
tion must pay close attention to these influences and others. One
goal of legal history must be to recapture both the sense of contin-
gency that existed at different historical periods and the range of
doctrinal choices that seemed available. Many historical events, as
do many current events, result from a complex interaction of influ-
ences and conterinfluences, such that the end result may look more
like chemistry among conflicting "causes" than simple but/for cau-
sation. Even after the rejection of the paradigm of the English bor-
ough, American lawyers appear to have retained a sense of choice
concerning the scope of city powers. The task that remains is to
examine how and why that sense of choice gradually narrowed into
a unitary law of city powerlessness.
links between Cooley andJeffersonian thought, seeJones, Thomas Cooley and "Laissez Faire Con-
stitutionalism" A Reconsideration, 53J. AM. HisT. 751 (1967).
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